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The RICO Trend in Class Action Warfare
Briana Lynn Rosenbaum*
ABSTRACT: Aggregate litigation, including class-actionsand mass actions,
have been under attackfor decades. Recent Supreme Court cases have further
weakened class actions, and the current Congress is considering numerous
aggregatelitigationand tort reform efforts. Recently, defendants in aggregate
litigation have employed an additional tactic by filing civil RICO cases
againstplaintzffs' counsel. In a number of these cases, defendants'primarily
allegation is that plaintiffs' counsel arefraudulently inflating the value of
lawsuits by filing baseless lawsuits as part of aggregatelitigation. In some of
these cases, the predicate acts consist solely of litigationfilings: the filing of
complaints and related litigationdocuments in aggregatelitigation. Members
of the defense bar have made no secret of the fact that these RICO cases are
part of a larger strategy to prevent plaintzff' attorneysfrom bringinglargescale litigation. Despite the rich literatureon aggregatelitigation, there is little
scholarship exploring this recent aggressive use of RICO by the defense bar
and corporate interest groups to punish plaintiffs' attorneysfor the alleged
fraudulentfiling of aggregate litigation.
This Article pulls together several previously unassociated areas of
law-includingRICO, Rule ii, complex litigation, SLAPP motions, and
asbestos litigation-todevelop a modelfor defendants' use of RICO as a tool
ofreprisal.It argues that holdingplaintzyfs'attorneys liableunder civil RICO
solely for litigationactivities is illegal, results in the lamentablefederalization
of state common law, and leads to improper forum shopping. The RICO
reprisalalso avoids legitimatestateprotectionsfor litigationactivity and is a
thinly veiled attempt by the defense barto further weaken aggregate litigation
by targeting the plaintiffs' attorneys themselves. This use of RICO punishes
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the aggregate litigation device itself rather than the underlyingfraudulent
conduct; as a remedyforfrivolous aggregatelitigationconduct, it is both overand under-inclusive. The Article concludes by proposingseveral alternatives,
including effectively barringany civil RICO action targetingattorneys'pure
litigation activities without a showing of malicious intent-a proposal that
draws on existing common law litigationprivilege doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION

Many plaintiffs would be shocked to learn that a law firm could file a mass
action consisting of over 5300 claims on behalf of asbestos victims and then
be forced to pay over $7 million dollars to the opposing party because i i of
the plaintiffs-or just 0.2 %-did not actually suffer the alleged harms. Yet
that is precisely what happened in CSX Transportation,Inc. v. Gilkison, in which
the defendants in a mass-action case aggressively and unconventionally used
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the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO")
statute against their opponents.,
The CSXdecision reflects a broader trend in which corporate defendants
are fighting back-seeking to punish plaintiffs' attorneys by bringing RICO
claims alleging that plaintiffs' attorneys have brought baseless lawsuits mixed
in with their clients who actually suffered an injury.- Members of the defense
bar have made no secret about the fact that these RICO cases are part of a
larger strategy to stamp out large-scale aggregate litigation.3

1.
See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012) (RICO statute); 3 Defendants in Asbestos Fraud
ConspiracyAgree to $7.3 Million Settlement: CSX Trans. v. Peirce, 37 No. 3 WESTLAwJ. ASBESTOS 4 (Nov.
21, 2014). CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Gilkison is a civil RICO case by a railroad company against
attorneys at the now-defunct law firm, Peirce Raimond & Coulter PC ("the Peirce firm"), for
collaborating with a plaintiff-friendly expert to hide baseless lawsuits among thousands of asbestosis
claims against CSX. SeegeneralyAmended Complaint, CSX Transp., Inc. v. Gilkison, No. 5:05-cV-202
(N.D.W. Va. July 5, 2007). Despite the fact that CSX identified only ii "baseless" claims out of the
Peirce firm's over 5300 total asbestosis claims, CSX obtained ajury verdict of about $430,000 in its
favor, which was automatically tripled under RICO to roughly $1.3 million. 3 Defendants in Asbestos
Fraud Conspiracy Agree to $7.3 Million Settlement: CSX Trans. v. Peirce, supra, at 4. This verdict also
made the Peirce firm liable for potentially $io million in costs and attorneys' fees, as RICO liability
triggers automatic shifting of both the costs of the underlying litigation and the costs and attorney's
fees of the civil RICO action. The Peirce firm understandably settled the case for $7.3 million
dollars. Emily Field, CSX, Asbestos Attys End 4 th Circ. RICO Fight with $ 7 -3 M Deal, LAw36o (Nov. 6,
2014, 7:20 PM), http://www.law36o.com/articles/59 4 159/csx-asbestos-attys-end-4th-circ-ricofight-with-7-3m-deal. As one of the lawyers for CSX boasted, this is "believed to be the first civil
verdict in history to find lawyers in violation of federal racketeering laws for the filing of fraudulent
lawsuits." See Samuel L. Tarry,Jr., Ethical andProfessionalLessons from CSX Transp. Inc. v. Peirce et al.,
DRIASBESTOS MED. SEMINAR PUBLICATIONS 535, 539 (2013), https://www.thelibrarybook.net/pdfethical-and-professional-lessons-from-csx-transp-inc-v-peirce-et-al.html.

For a full case study of CSA,

see infta Part II.
2.
Tiger Joyce, How Business Can FightFraudulent Lawsuits: Trial Lawyers May Increasingly
Feel the Sting of the Racketeer Influenced and CorruptOrganizationsAct, WALL STREETJ. (Mar. 6, 2014,
7:28 PM),http://www.wsj.com/articles/SBiooo42405270230481500457941960002691 1302.
In this Article, I use the term "aggregate litigation" to mean any category of large-scale litigation
in the judicial system involving multiple parties. Other authors have used the term "group
litigation" to describe this same category of litigation. See, e.g., JOHN C. COFFEE, JR.,
ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE 1-7 (2015). The term aggregate
litigation includes a number of different devices, many of which this Article will reference. These
include: (1) class actions, or litigation where representative plaintiffs litigate on behalf of
numerous absent class members, 1 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:1 (William B. Rubenstein
ed., 5 th ed. 2016); (2) mass actions, a nebulous term broadly meaning a non-representative
action in which numerous claims are tried jointly, id. § 6:24; and (3) multidistrict litigation
("MDL"), or groups of separate cases that are consolidated and temporarily transferred to one
state or federal court, usually for determination of limited pretrial common questions, see DAVID
F. HERR, ANNOTATED MANUAL FOR COMPLEx LITIGATION §§ 20.13-14 (4 th ed. 2o16).
TigerJoyce, President of the American Tort Reform Association ("ATRA"), argued that
3.
RICO "could become a powerful tool in the hands of companies that are tired of lawsuit
shakedowns." See Joyce, supra note 2. Darren McKinney, also of the ATRA, declared that
"[c]ompanies are watching" suits like CSX "because they're sick and tired of unfair mass-tort
verdicts." Paul M. Barrett, Chevron's $i9 Billion Day in Court: It's Battling a Massive judgment by
Targeting a Plaintiffs' Lawyer, BLOOMBERG

BUSINESSWEEK

(Oct.

17,

2013,

4:36

PM),

http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2o3-o-i6/chevrons-day-in-court. According to Mr.
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In this Article, I analyze and evaluate the defense bar's recent aggressive
use of RICO against plaintiffs' attorneys. I argue that this practice, which I
have labeled "the RICO reprisal," is illegal on several grounds, most notably
under the Rules Enabling Act and the RICO statute. It is also normatively
undesirable because it results in federalization of state common law that will
lead to improper forum shopping and avoidance of legitimate state
protections for litigation activities. The defense bar's use of RICO also
threatens a principle at the core of ourjustice system: the right to petition the
courts for redress. It does this by over-penalizing the harm at issue, specious
claiming, and by punishing the aggregate litigation device itself, rather than
the proven fraudulent conduct.
Further, it is unclear that the RICO reprisal is necessary to address
specious claiming, as there are several remedial alternatives-such as
malicious prosecution and Rule 11 -already built into our legal system. These
remedial alternatives all incorporate some consideration of the historical
balance of competing interests involved in prosecuting frivolous litigation:
access to justice, efficiency, and reduction of waste in the judicial system. The
RICO reprisal is entirely lacking this type of measured policy consideration.
Aggregate litigation, including the class-action and mass action devices,
have been under attack for decades. From the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA")4 and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
("CAFA")s to Supreme Court decisions like Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,6 our
justice system has slowly begun "closing the courthouse doors" to class
actions.7 And this trend continues. Congress is currently considering
additional class action and tort reform measures, including one aimed at

&

McKinney, these cases are "providing a model for how to fight back." Id Gibson, Dunn

Crutcher LLP, one of the firms representing Chevron in another civil RICO case against
plaintiffs' attorneys, touts on its website that it works with clients to create an "affirmative strategy
to ultimately end the litigation." Press Release, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Gibson Dunn
Launches Transnational Litigation and Foreign Judgments Practice Group (Dec. 15, 2010),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/news/Pages/GibsonDunnLaunchesTransnationalLitigationandF
oreignJudgmentsPracticeGroup.aspx.
4.
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered
5.
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
6.
See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
Seegenerally Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the CourthouseDoors, go DENV. U. L. REV. 317 (2012).
7.
See also, e.g., COFFEE, supra note 2, at 125-32; COFFEE, supra note 2, at 2 ("[I]f the invention and

development of the class action was the dominant judicial innovation of the late twentieth century, its
dismantling appears to be the major procedural project of the conservative majority of the
contemporary Supreme Court in the twenty-first century."); Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class
Actions, go WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 729 (2013) ("Starting in the mid-iggos, courts began expressing
concern about the pressure on defendants to settle after a decision certifying a class."); Arthur R Miller,
The Preervationand Rejuvenation ofAggregateLitigation:A Systernic Imperative, 64 EMORY L.J. 293, 296-305
(2014) (detailing the "sharp reaction" against class action practice starting in the g9os in the courts,
public opinion, and legislature).
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sending more class actions to federal courts8 and one which would require
asbestos-bankruptcy trusts to make claimants' details public.9
The defense bar's motivation for reform is understandable. Class actions
and other aggregate devices have sometimes yielded fraud and deceit. There
is a common perception that certain aspects of aggregate litigation procedure
lead plaintiffs' attorneys to over-zealously litigate to ensure lucrative fees."o
Plaintiffs' attorneys in the mass tort context have been specifically subject to
censure for filing frivolous litigation. In particular, defendants and defense
groups have routinely accused mass tort plaintiffs' attorneys of a particular
practice called specious claiming-namely, for knowingly filing meritless
claims among mass actions in an effort to inflate settlements." Legislators,
defense groups, and some scholars have heaped significant criticism on
plaintiffs' attorneys for this practice, accusing them of "cash [ing] in on ...
national traged[ies]" in their own self-interest."'
Whether there is a problem with specious claiming in the mass tort
context, or more broadly in aggregate litigation, is far from clear. In fact,
scholars have long debated the issue. But, in several high-profile mass torts
cases, judges have publicly called out plaintiffs' attorneys for egregious
practices resulting in the filing of a significant number of meritless claims.'3
Enterprising defendants are exploiting the perception that these cases create
by bringing civil RICO cases against their opposing counsel. And defense
groups are urging them on, arguing that existing remedies against frivolous
lawsuits-like Rule 1 1 sanctions-"provide little solace to defendants who
spend millions of dollars to defend against frivolous or fraudulent claims."'4

See FraudulentJoinder Prevention Act of 2016, H.R. 3624, 11 4 th Cong.
SeeFairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act
H.R. 1927, 11 4 th Cong.
See, e.g., Paul M. Barrett, judge Finds Fraudand Deceit by Plaintiffs' Lawyers in Asbestos Cases,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 13, 2014,9:57 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2o1401-1 3 /garlock-asbestos claim cut-go-percent-because-of-plaintiffs-lawyers-deceit (stating that "asbestos
8.
9.
of 2016,
10.

insulation, worker injury, and courtroom excess has reached a truly repulsive phase"). For a more
general discussion of the critiques of class actions and other aggregate devices, see COFFEE, supranote
2, at 133-53.

11.
Mark A. Behrens, Asbestos Litigation Screening Challenges: An Update, 26 T.M. COOLEY L.
REv. 721, 727 (2009) (discussing some State Supreme Court efforts to remove the "economic
incentive [s]" inherent to mass claiming); Lester Brickman, On the Theory Class's Theories ofAsbestos

Litigation:The DisconnectBetween Scholarship and Reality, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 33, 35 (2003) (describing
the "malignant enterprise" of "specious claiming in asbestos litigation").
12.

Brickman, supra note 11, at 35.
See, e.g., Behrens, supra note 11, at 727; S. Todd Brown, Specious Claiming and Global
13.
Settlements, 42 U. MEM. L. REv. 559, 582 (2012); Nora Freeman Engstrom, Retaliatory RICO and
the Puzzle ofFraudulentClaiming, 115 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017);Jay Weaver, FraudPollutes
BP Oil-Spill Compensation Fundfor Gulf Coast Victims from Foridato Louisiana, MIAMI HERALD (Aug.
19, 2012, 5 :oo AM), http://www.miamiherald.com/latest-news/article19 4 2o87.html.
VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ & CARY SILvERMAN, U.S. CHAMBER INsT. LEGAL REFORM, LAWSUIT
14.
ECOSYSTEM II: NEW TRENDS, TARGETS AND PLAYERS 117 (2014), http://www.instituteforlegal
reform.com/research/lawsuit-ecosystem-ii-new-targets-trends-and-players.
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But, even if there may be a need to reform either aggregate litigation
devices or the remedies against frivolous litigation,'s civil RICO actions against
aggregate litigation attorneys is not the proper method to achieve this reform.
In addition to over-penalizing the conduct, civil RICO actions have a
significant impact upon filing, painting RICO defendants as not just
fraudsters, but mobsters and racketeers. As the First Circuit has explained,
"Civil RICO is an unusually potent weapon-the litigation equivalent of a
thermonuclear device. The very pendency of a RICO suit can be stigmatizing
and its consummation can be costly."' 6

Improper conduct in litigation is not a new issue, and attorneys have long
been subject to civil liability and other penalties for filing frivolous litigation.
Historically, parties subjected to such conduct have used a number of options
for recourse, including requesting Rule i i or other sanctions, filing abuse-ofprocess or malicious-prosecution claims, and filing complaints with the state
bar association. Defendants have used these tools in the past, including in
asbestos and other related mass tort litigation.'7 Some critics have even argued
that the defense bar and corporate interests have used these tools so
effectively that they have succeeded in building a narrative of the plaintiffs'
attorneys as "ethically-challenged" bounty-hunters.' 8
But cases like CSX take that narrative to a new extreme. Actions like CSX
do more than penalize specious claiming-they penalize plaintiffs' attorneys
for their decisions to file complaints in aggregate litigation. Civil RICO claims
targeting plaintiffs' lawyers usually rely in whole, or in large part, on mail or
wire fraud as predicate acts. In fact, using mail fraud as a RICO predicate act
is a popular choice because it is fairly easy to plead: a plaintiff need not show
that the mailings themselves were fraudulent if they were part of an overall
scheme to defraud. It is not hard to see how this can easily impact attorneys
in aggregate litigation. Any defendants in aggregate litigation sue their
opposing counsel under civil RICO with a simple formula: identify a few bad
The purpose of this Article is not to debate the need for class actions or mass actions,
15.
nor is it to detail the failings of those devices. For thorough discussions of the competing
narratives on the desirability, merit, and efficacy of class actions and other aggregate litigation
and citations to primary contributors in the aggregate litigation discussion, see generally
Alexandra D. Lahav, Two Views of the Class Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1939 (2011); Linda S.
Mullenix, Ending ClassActions as We Know Them: Rethinking the American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.

J. 399, 406-17

(2014).

Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 5991); see also Melvin L. Otey,
Why Rico's ExtraterritorialReach is Properly Coextensive with the Reach of its Predicates, 14 J. INT'L Bus.
& L. 33, 36 (2015) ("Both the potential financial rewards for plaintiffs, and the stigma that may
attach to RICO defendants, make the statute a powerful weapon for aggrieved parties." (quoting
DLJ Mortg. Capital, Inc. v. Kontogiannis, 726 F. Supp. 2d 225, 236 (E.D.N.Y. 2010))).
16.

17.

See infra Part IV.

18.
Mullenix, supra note 15, at 417; id. at 413 (describing "the darker counternarrative"
against class actions); see also Brooke D. Coleman, The Effciency Norm, 56 B.C. L. REv. 1777, 1793-95
(2015) (discussing the rhetoric promoted by the media and lobbyists largely blaming plaintiffs' lawyers
for the increased cost in the litigation system).
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claims, tie that to a wider "scheme" to undermine the defendants, and broad
swaths of conduct may be swept into the net of liability.
The implications for this expanded scope of liability are severe. Notably,
unlike traditional remedies for frivolous litigation like malicious prosecution
and Rule i i, civil RICO includes automatic treble damages and fee-shifting
provisions that allow victorious RICO plaintiffs to shift the costs of litigating
both the underlying aggregate litigation and the RICO claim onto the
opposing counsel. These treble damages and fee-shifting provisions
transformed a $429,240.47 case in CSX-as reflected in the jury verdict-to a
$7.3 million dollar settlement.'9
There is a danger that the result of such judgments will be to undercut
the legitimate use of aggregate procedural devices like class actions, mass
actions, and multi-district litigation.2o This is because private attorneys are
expected to take on the enormous risks and costs associated with filing
aggregate litigation. The onerous penalties of RICO, coupled with the risks
and uncertainty necessarily involved in aggregate litigation, mean that
applying RICO to specious lawsuits in such contexts might easily "chill
litigants and lawyers and frustrate the well-established public policy goal of
maintaining open access to courts."2' In light of this, RICO reprisals become
just what the defense bar has threatened: a thinly veiled attempt to further
weaken aggregate litigation by targeting the plaintiffs' attorneys themselves.22
There is a rich literature developing the concept of, and debating the
wisdom of, the role of the plaintiff attorney in the context of aggregate
litigation. Earlier literature written by scholars like Judge Jack Weinstein
contains a vibrant discussion of the complexities of that role and, in
particular, of the ethical strains that are placed on public law attorneys as a
result of their dual roles as fiduciary and entrepreneur.23 Since that time,
however, the scholarship has largely gone the way of popular opinion, often

See supranote i and accompanying text.
One court rejecting this very use of civil RICO warned: "If any litigant's or attorney's
pleading and correspondence in an unsuccessful lawsuit could lead to drastic RICO liability in a
private right of action, litigants might hesitate to avail themselves of the courts and available legal
remedies or be unable to find representation to help vindicate their rights." Curtis & Assocs., P.C.
v. Law Offices of David M. Bushman, Esq., 758 F. Supp. 2d 153, 173 (E.D.N.Y. 201o), affd sub
nom. Curtis v. Law offices of David M. Bushman, Esq., 443 F. App'x 582 (2d Cir. 201 1).
21.
Curtis &Assocs., 758 F. Supp. 2d at 173.
22.
Judge John W. Wade made a similar argument about the retaliatory use of state
common law torts to discourage meritorious traditional two-party actions, "notjust those that are
frivolous." John W. Wade, On Frivolous Litigation:A Study of Tort Liability and ProceduralSanctions,
14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 433, 436 (1986).
23.
See generally, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazzard Jr., Reflections on judge Weinstein's Ethical
Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 56g (1994); Thomas W. Henderson & Tybe
A. Brett, A TrialLawyer's Commentary on OneJurist's Musing of the Legal Occult: A Response to judge
Weinstein, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 592 (1994); Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort as Public Law Litigation:
ParadigmMisplaced, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 579 (1994) ;Jack B. Weinstein, EthicalDilemmasin Mass Tort
Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 469 (1994).
19.

20.
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focusing on a smaller subset of ethical issues related to perceived egregious
plaintiff lawyering in aggregate cases. Examples include studies of conflicts of
interest,24 discussions of frivolous or fraudulent litigation in mass tort
litigation, 5 and financial matters, such as settlements and cy pres remedies
perceived as funneling monies to plaintiff attorneys.2 6
But despite the wide array of current scholarship on aggregate litigation,
there is relatively little analyzing the tort and procedural mechanisms that
private parties may utilize to combat perceived misconduct by plaintiffs'
attorneys in the mass tort context.27 Specifically, no legal scholar has
considered whether this recent aggressive use of RICO by the defense bar and
corporate interest groups to punish plaintiffs' attorneys for the alleged
fraudulent filing of aggregate litigation is a proper method of regulation.S
The question becomes particularly weighty when one takes into account the
complexities involved in the attorney general role. Specifically, this author
accepts the fact that plaintiffs' attorneys act in a semi-official capacity in
aggregate litigation when they pursue rights that would go otherwise
unredressed-including in some mass tort litigation.29 Furthermore, it is
assumed that this capacity carries with it added private burdens-such as
hiring experts, the costs of identifying, diagnosing, and managing thousands

24.
See generally, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client
Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519; Martin H. Redish,
Rethinking the Theory of the ClassAction: The Risks and Rewards of CapitalisticSocialism in the Litigation
Process, 6 4 EMORY L.J. 451 (2014).
25.
See, e.g., Peggy L. Ableman, The Garlock Decision Should Be Required Readingfor All Trial
Court judges in Asbestos Cases, 37 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 479, 488 (2014) (blaming secrecy in
bankruptcy process in part for resulting "widespread . .. deceptive practices"); Lester Brickman,
Fraud and Abuse in Mesothelioma Litigation, 88 TuL. L. REV. 1071, 1150-51 (2014) (documenting

the practice of double-claiming against bankruptcy and tort); S. Todd Brown, How Long is Forever
This Time? The Broken Promise of Bankruptcy Trusts, 61 BuFF. L. REV. 537, 557-58 (2013); Victor E.
Schwartz & Rochelle M. Tedesco, The Law of Unintended Consequences in Asbestos Litigation: How
Efforts to Streamline the Litigation Have Fueled More Claims, 71 Miss. L.J. 531, 537 (2001) (arguing
that the focus on judicial efficiency results in inequities in the courts, including incentivizing
plaintiffs' lawyers to file thousands of claims that lack merit).
26.
See generally, e.g., Howard Erichson, Aggregation as Disempowerment: Red Flags in Class
Action Settlements, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming) (arguing that settlement class actions
benefit both defendants and plaintiffs' attorneys at the expense of plaintiffs); Martin H. Redish,
Peter Julian & Samantha Zyontz, Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A
Normative andEmpiricalAnalysis, 62 FI. L. REV. 617 (2010).
27.
One exception to this is the asbestos litigation symposium article of Keith N. Hylton,
who considers principles of optimal deterrence, repetitive public harm, and resource-allocation
in analyzing the problem of fraudulent claiming and ultimately proposes a sanction on plaintiffs'
attorneys in mass tort cases tied to "the revenue anticipated from the [knowingly] fraudulent
claims divided by the probability of detection." Keith N. Hylton, Asbestos and Mass Torts with
FraudulentVictims, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 575, 590 (2oo8).
28.
But see generally Engstrom, supra note 13 (using RICO reprisal cases to develop a
definition and categorization of fraud in the mass tort litigation system).
29.
See COFFEE, supra note 2, at 4-5, 156; Henderson & Brett, supra note 23, at 599-6o00;
Weinstein, supra note 23, at 47 2-74-
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of plaintiffs, filing cases, etc.-all with uncertain rewards.3o Given these facts,
there remain unanswered questions about how aggregate lawyers should be
regulated, including whether any remedial scheme aimed at deterring
improper conduct properly considers issues of access tojustice, efficiency, and
reduction of waste in the judicial system without threatening the private
attorney general device as a whole.
To explain this problem and possible solutions, this Article proceeds as
follows. Part II explores the landscape of regulation of frivolous claiming in
aggregate litigation by outlining several alternative remedies for frivolous
litigation practices and corresponding protections for attorneys. As part of
that analysis, Part III draws on the existing aggregate litigation literature and
highlights how aggregation can both exacerbate the problem of frivolous
litigation and enhance the need for access to justice protections. Part IV then
provides a brief background of the civil RICO statute and explains how it is
being deployed by defendants against plaintiffs' attorneys in aggregate
litigation. It provides a case study of CS)X the only case known to go to trial
and result in a verdict for civil RICO violations as a result of over-aggregation.
Next, it explores the use of civil RICO in other litigation against plaintiffs'
attorneys, and draws a distinction between CSXand cases involving allegations
of either systemic or external wrongdoing.
Part V analyzes the doctrinal, policy, and structural implications of the
RICO reprisal. It argues the RICO reprisal is illegal and results in the
lamentable federalization of state common law. More importantly, the RICO
reprisal punishes the aggregate-litigation device itself, rather than the
underlying fraudulent conduct, and this is an excessive penalty for the harm
of over-aggregation. To remedy these problems, Part VI offers several
proposals, including effectively barring any civil RICO action targeting
attorneys' pure litigation activities without a showing of malicious intent-a
proposal that draws on one of the existing common law protections for
attorneys: the litigation privilege doctrine. The mere act of filing a few
complaints in court should not justify RICO liability for an entire aggregate
litigation. Instead, courts should require proof of a broader intended scheme
to harm.
II.

REMEDIES FOR FRIVOLOUS CLAIMS IN AGGREGATE LITIGATION

Unfortunately, improper conduct in litigation-both in traditional twoparty actions and aggregate litigation-is not a new issue. As a result, attorneys
have long been subject to regulation for legal malpractice. Courts have held
lawyers civilly liable to former adversaries for their actions in bringing
frivolous litigation on a number of theories, including Rule i i or other state

See Weinstein, supranote 23, at 502-06 (analyzing potential conflicts of interest raised,
30.
in particular, by the fact that "[u]sually the attorney has a financial stake in the litigation greater
than that of any single litigant").
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sanctions, abuse of process or malicious prosecution claims, and complaints
with the state bar association.
Defendants and defense interest groups have complained of a wide
variety of bad conduct by attorneys in aggregate litigation-and specifically in
mass torts cases-including: "withholding crucial evidence," "unjustly
tarnishing [a] company's reputation in the press," and even "manipulating
the legal system."3' But one of the most common allegations in the recently
filed RICO actions against aggregate attorneys is that plaintiffs' attorneys are
filing frivolous claims among aggregate actions in an effort to inflate the value
of the overall aggregate litigation. Some have characterized this
phenomenon-at
alternative
times
called
specious
claiming,
oversubscription, and overaggregation-as a particular feature in mass tort
litigation, brought about almost entirely by the perverse incentives raised
when plaintiffs' attorneys must both finance extremely costly litigation
through contingency-fee arrangements and represent a large number of
clients with often diverse claims.32
Of course, the term frivolous litigation is itself a murky term.33 This is so
in part because it can include broad categories of conduct, from simply
"bringing ... a lawsuit that has no merit" to bringing a lawsuit with bad faith.34
It is also in part due to the difficulty of finding agreement on what litigation
is frivolous and what sanctions should apply. For example, it is clear that a
plaintiffs' attorney who knowingly lies when filing a claim has acted
"fraudulently" and should be subject to sanctions, it is less obvious what
should happen to a plaintiffs' attorney who brings a claim that has little merit
but raises a novel legal claim. In short: without a precise definition, it is hard
to determine exactly when a plaintiffs' attorney crosses the line between
sanctionable misconduct and zealous advocate.
But, as this Part articulates, there are a series of doctrines that have
developed precisely for this reason: to categorize, target, and, over time,
define sanctionable conduct. Remedial doctrines like Rule 1 1 and malicious
prosecution achieve these objectives by incorporating some consideration of
the historical balance of competing interests involved in prosecuting frivolous
litigation. They primarily include: access to justice, efficiency, and reduction
of waste in the judicial system.

31.

Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 14, at 117.

See Behrens, supra note i i, at 727; Brickman, supra note I I, at 36.
32.
Robert G. Bone, Modeling FrivolousSuits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 529-33 (1997) (offering a
33.
model of frivolous litigation in the context of Rule i sanctions); Brown, supra note 13, at 586-91
(defining specious claims in the context of mass torts litigation); Alexander A. Reinert, Screening Out
Innovation: The Merits ofMeritlessLitigation, 89 IND. LJ. 1191, 1195-96 (2014) (discussing definitions of
frivolous and differentiating between frivolous and meritless litigation as a means of determining how
to manage ongoing litigation).
Wade, supra note 22, at 437 n.11, 438.
34.
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This Part first articulates the context of frivolous litigation regulation,
including the remedial goals underlying various sanctions and torts and the
particular concerns such regulation plays in the aggregate-litigation context.
Next, it examines the existing remedial alternatives that litigants like CSX
have when faced with potentially frivolous litigation, as well as models others
have suggested for enhancing the effectiveness of these alternatives.
Considering the full range of alternatives, the expanded use of RICO-and
therefore, the potential dampening of access to the courts in aggregate
litigation-is a mistake.
A.

ACHIEVING A BALANCE: GOALS OFREGULATION OFMERITLESS LITIGATION

Whether in the traditional two-party litigation or aggregate-litigation
context, any scheme aimed at deterring frivolous litigation must balance two
competing goals: preservation of "free access to the courts" and providing "an
effective means with which to redress litigation abuse."3s One party's right to
be free from frivolous, baseless, or abusive litigation competes with another
party's right to use the justice system for legitimate purposes to settle
grievances or report crimes. Any statutory or common-law scheme aimed at
frivolous litigation must be "carefully circumscribed" 6 to reach both goals,
while recognizing that they might be in competition.
A review of the torts and remedies designed to combat frivolous
litigation-described more fully below-shows a purposeful design with these
competing interests in mind. These torts, and the common-law litigation
immunities that have developed alongside them, have evolved over time to
include precise elements and burdens of proof designed to address one or
both of these policy goals.
Generally, courts have disfavored malicious prosecution actions because
they discourage litigation.37 The American legal system is designed to settle
disputes primarily via litigation, and, as a result, the right to seek legal redress
is guarded "zealously."35 The idea that "[o]ne who believes that he has been
aggrieved should be entitled to approach the courts for relief without having
to guarantee that he is correct" is an important characteristic of the right of
redress in the American system of justice.so Many procedural aspects of our
court system are designed to permit potential plaintiffs to use the courts "to
35.

Byron C. Keeling, Toward A Balanced Approach to "Frivolous"Litigation: A Critical Review

ofFederalRule ii and State Sanctions Provisions, 21 PEPP. L. REv. 1067, 1125 (1994); see alsoJohn

M.Johnson & G. Edward Cassady III, Frivolous Lawsuits and Defensive Responses to Them-What Relief
is Available?, 36 ALA. L. REV. 927, 928-31 (1985); 4-34 ROGER E. WARIN, BUSINESS TORTS

§ 34.01

(2015) (LEXIS).
WARIN, supra note 35, § 34.01.
36.
See id.; Wade, supra note 22, at 434 ("Because of theirjealous protection of the position
37.
that they should always be open for the public to use, the courts have frequently declared that
they do not favor the action.").
38. Johnson & Cassady, supra note 35, at 928-29.
Wade, supra note 22, at 433.
39.
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find out how they had been injured and how they could prove their case."4o
This includes procedures like notice pleading, class actions, and wide
discovery practice.4' The fear is that if plaintiffs have too high of a burden to
access the courts, wrongs will go unaddressed, particularly for underprivileged
classes of people.42 But access to the courts serves more than simply to help
resolve disputes; it is also a critical aspect of our democracy. Litigation by
private parties "affirm [s] transparency in law-making and participation in the
development of law," and provides "an additional avenue for citizen
participation in government."43
If malicious prosecutions actions potentially cut out underprivileged
petitioners, aggregate litigation specifically empowers those kinds of
petitioners to redress their wrongs. As such, access to aggregate litigation is
essential as a valuable "tool of regulatory policy."44 The device does more than
merely join claims-it also "advances substantive law values such as
deterrence, compensation, fairness, and efficiency."45 For many types of
claims, aggregate litigation is the only effective means of offering redress to
litigants and deterring bad actors. This includes cases in the mass tort
context.4 6 As scholar Samuel Issacharoff noted, "[1] egal rights cannot exist in
a vacuum. Without an effective enforcement strategy, legal rights risk
becoming ceremonial declarations that invite disrespect."47 Of course,
commentators have also argued that various aggregate litigation devices,
including class actions and mass actions, have negative effects, such as
overcompensation, over-deterrence, and over-aggregation.48 Thus, the
literature contains hundreds of proposals for reforming these devices to
better achieve their goals.49 Regardless of whether it could or should be
reformed, aggregate litigation has a valuable place in our current system of
procedural justice in providing compensation and deterrence in some

40.
Jack B. Weinstein, The Role ofjudges in a Government of by, andfor the People: Notes for the
Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 3o CARDozo L. REV. 1, 104 (2008).
Id. But see id. at 105 (arguing that recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has made it
41.
"harder for a plaintiff to enter the courts").
42.
Id. at 1o6 (quoting Anita Bernstein, Complaints, 32 McGEORGE L. REv. 37, 44 (2000)).
Id.
43.
44.
Zachary D. Clopton, Transnational Class Actions in the Shadow of Preclusion, go IND. L.J.
1387, 1390 (2015).
45.
Id. at 1392; see also id. at 1390 n.15 (collecting sources that describe the importance of
aggregate litigation as a tool of regulatory policy).
Howard M. Erichson, A Typology of Aggregate Settlements, 8o NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1769,
46.
1774 (2005) (discussing how mass torts can proceed even absent class certification).
47.
Samuel Issacharoff, Group Litigation of Consumer Claims: Lessons from the U.S. Experience,
34 TEX.INT'LL.J. 135, 150 (1999).
48.
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrenceand its
Implementation, 1o6 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1536 (20o6) (proposing that individual corporate
defendants be held directly liable in securities class actions in order to better promote deterrence).
See infra notes 298-31o and accompanying text.
49.
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contexts where there is no other practical and available alternative in the U.S.
system ofjustice to meet these ends.so
While access to the courts-including through aggregate litigationcannot be questioned as a valuable goal, such access need not be unlimited.
An equally important goal is to deter litigation abuse, and prevent frivolous
filings. At various times, courts, legislatures, and scholars have identified
different purposes for sanctions and attorney-litigation-misconduct
regulation, including: "(i) deterring frivolous filings, (2) punishing lawyers
and litigants who pursue frivolous filings, and (3) compensating the victims
of frivolous filings."s' The various methods of regulating frivolous lawsuits
discussed below have one or more of these goals in mind.
Any discussion of frivolous litigation in the aggregate litigation context
must take into account the complex and often competing interests that have
developed among the various actors in the legal system. Indeed, aggregate
litigation is practically defined by the multiple conflicts inherent in the
devices.52 These include the tension between the need for individualized
justice, which is rooted deeply in our system ofjustice, and the need to employ
effective aggregative techniques to settle certain types of claims.53 There is also

the tension inherent in the role of class counsel, who necessarily must act both
as a "public servant" and as a self-interested entrepreneurs4 Any remedial
scheme targeting lawyers in representative litigation must take these issues
into account. The plaintiffs' attorney is a public servant when she "furthers
the deterrent effect of the law by harnessing the power of representative
litigation."s5 Essentially, the aggregate-litigation plaintiffs' attorney acts as a
"private attorney general," by righting wrongs in society that will otherwise go
unaddressed.5 6This can happen, for example, when the stakes in the cases are
too low or the cost of the litigation is too high to justify individual actions.57
Government regulation, self-regulation, and non-judicial resolutions are three other
50.
recognized ways of regulating aggregate wrongs. The literature casts doubt on the effectiveness
of these alternatives, at least when considering low-value, high impact claims. Seelssacharoff, supra
note 47, at 150.

Keeling, supra note 35, at 1135 (footnotes omitted).
51.
For an excellent discussion of the character of aggregate litigation and the tensions that
52.
define it, see Lahav, supra note 15, at 1948. See also generally Hazzard, supra note 23; Mullenix,
supra note 23; Weinstein, supranote 23.
Weinstein, supra note 23, at 490, 493-95.
53.
See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of EntrepreneurialLitigation:BalancingFairnessand
54.
Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 5 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 888-89 (1987) (describing lawyers as a
type of entrepreneur); Lahav, supra note 15, at i948 (describing attorneys as public servants).
55.

Lahav, supra note 15, at 1948.

Id.
56.
Some critics might call this type of action "negative-value." This author avoids using the
57.
term so broadly, as it paints an inaccurate picture of the reality of modern aggregate litigation.
SeeLinda Sandstrom Simard, A View from Within theFortune5 oo: An EmpiricalStudy ofNegative Value
Class Actions and Deterrence, 47 IND. L. REv. 739, 740 n-5 (2014) (collecting sources presenting
differing definitions of the term and efforts to identify types of aggregate claims).
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Despite this "public service" role, American aggregate litigation devices are
also set up to require plaintiffs' attorneys in mass action litigation to be selfinterested entrepreneurs. The way this litigation works is by "creating
incentives for lawyers to bring private enforcement actions." 5 When
individual lawsuits have damages that are too small or too complex to make
individual litigation worthwhile, pooling these claims can create an incentive
pot large enough to cover reasonable attorneys' fees. But this procedure also
requires that the plaintiffs' attorney be the one to make the investment, and
take the risk, in the litigation.59
These tensions have led to critiques of the practice of aggregate
litigation-particularly how that system exacerbates the problem of frivolous
litigation.o Aggregate ligation is so costly that plaintiffs' attorneys develop
perverse incentives to litigate claims-even weak claims-overzealously,
knowing the litigation may prompt either verdicts or valuable settlements.
This structural characteristic can lead to specious claiming; that is, when
plaintiffs bring weak cases in the same litigation as strong ones. 6 ' Because

aggregate cases are often settled on a lump-sum basis, this allows potential
illegitimate recoveries, and allows the strong claims to subsidize the weak
ones. Specious claiming-or the hiding of i1 bad cases among 53oo-was
CSX's primary complaint against the Peirce firm. 62
B.

ALTERNATIVE REGULATION OFLITIGATION CONDUCT

Apart from RICO, there are many existing methods of regulating
attorney conduct in frivolous litigation. These methods can be broken up into
tort and procedural remedies. 63 Tort remedies include malicious prosecution
and abuse of process.64 Procedural remedies include sanctions under Rule 11

58. Janet Cooper Alexander, An Introduction to Class Action Procedure in the United States,
Presentation at the Debates over Group Litigation in Comparative Perspective, Geneva, Switzerland
2 (July 21, 2000), http://www.law.duke.edu/grouplit/papers/classactionalexander.pdf;
see also
Erichson, supra note 46, at 1774-75 (explaining the same concept in the context of mass tort
practice).
For a description of the mass tort plaintiffs' lawyer's law practice, including the
59.
economic characteristics of aggregate litigation and plaintiffs' attorneys' cost-exposure see
Erichson, supra note 46, at 1774.
6o. For a summary of common criticisms relating to frivolous litigation, especially in aggregate
litigation see COFFEE, supra note 2, at 1-7; Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lnfquist,Jurors'Judgmentsof
Business Liability in Tort Case: Implicationsfor the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 IAw & SOCY REV. 85,
93-96 (1992); Wade, supra note 22, at 433-36; John Lande, FailingFaith in Litigation?A Survey of
Business Lawyers' and Executives' Opinions, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L REv. 1, 26-28 (1998).
61.
For a discussion of specious claiming-defined as overaggregation and overvaluation
of weak cases in aggregate litigation-see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
62.
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
63.
In describing methods of regulating frivolous litigation conduct, I am borrowing the
taxonomy of ProfessorJohn Wade, formerly of Vanderbilt. Wade, supranote 22, at 434-35
64.
Defendants have other options in tort for bringing actions against frivolous litigators,
including fraud. 1 RONALD E. MALLEN & ALLISON MARTIN RHODEs, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 8:31
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or other specified statutes, cost-shifting statutes, and disciplinary sanctions.
Unlike in tort, where there are specific elements that must be proven,
procedural remedies give the court greater discretion to decide when and
how to impose a given sanction. For example, a court may invoke Rule 11 to
discipline an attorney and/or party after a single improper discovery action.
The torts of abuse of process and malicious civil prosecution-which I
refer to as the abusive litigation torts-are the primary remedies for baseless
litigation at common law. 65 Because the RICO reprisal represents, in essence,
frivolous litigation lawsuits, these torts will be my starting point. The elements
of malicious prosecution vary state by state, but generally require that a person
(1) initiate a proceeding (2) with "malice" (3) for which he had no "probable
cause" (4) that terminated in the plaintiffs favor. 66
As each jurisdiction has developed its malicious prosecution action,
whether through the legislature or the courts, it also makes choices between
the competing interests of access to courts and deterrence of litigation abuse.
And, in the context, these policy choices are usually quite clear. As an
example, one established element of malicious prosecution is termination of
the prior proceedings in favor of the accused. This requirement has
developed for two reasons. First, it ensures that there will not be "conflicting
resolutions arising out of the same or identical transaction,"67 which would
happen if a plaintiff won its malicious prosecution lawsuit-therefore, having
proven that the underlying litigation was without probable cause-, but later
lost as a defendant in the underlying litigation-meaning that ajudge or jury
found probable cause. Second, courts have long seen the favorable
termination requirement as protectingjustifiable claims: "for 'no man can say
of an action still pending that it is false or malicious,'"'6 and "unfavorable
termination is conclusive as to the existence of probable cause." 69
Another example of a purposeful-and clear-policy choice is a "special
damages" element, which has been adopted in a minority ofjurisdictions.o In
those states to require this additional element, malicious prosecution
plaintiffs must also prove damages in addition to the normal cost of defending
the lawsuit.7, The stated purpose of this rule is to shift the balance even
further toward protection of court access by preventing fee-shifting.72
(2016). Indeed, the plaintiff in CSXpled, and successfully proved, common law fraud in addition
to its RICO claims. However, the analysis here will be limited to those torts most directly targeted
toward groundless litigation conduct.
65.
SeeWade, supra note 22, at 437-53; see also generally Matthew Spohn, CombatingBad-Faith
Litigation Tactics With Claimsfor Abuse of Process, 38 COLO. LAW. 31 (2009).
66.
See Wade, supra note 22, at 438.
67.
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994).
68.
Gordon v. West, 59 S.E. 232, 233 (Ga. 1907) (quoting Parker v. Langley, to Mod. 2og).
69.
4-34 WARIN, supra note 35, § 34.02.
70.

Wade, supra note 22, at 4 42.

71.

Id.

72.

Id. at 443. Special damages have been proven in the aggregate context by interference
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Malicious prosecution covers the improper initiation of lawsuits. The tort
of abuse of process, by contrast, covers the use of an individual legal process
for an improper purpose.73 This tort "emphasizes the plaintiffs subjective
intent-not the objective merits of his claim."74 Accordingly, a claimant need
not prove that the underlying process used was without probable cause.75
Just like malicious prosecution, abuse of process requires a showing of
malice.7 6 This means that a claimant cannot prevail unless she shows that the
defendant used either the process or the litigation "to accomplish a purpose
for which it is not designed."77 For abuse of process, this is a narrow test, asking
whether the process was used primarily for an ulterior purpose. Malicious
prosecution is similarly focused on the motive, but asks whether the entire
litigation was brought for some reason other than "for the purpose of giving
the person exercising the right an opportunity to determine whether his claim
is legally justified and, if it is, to obtain a remedy that the law provides."7 8
Although an ulterior motive for the litigation can be proven in various ways,
it is often expressed as "knowledge that there is no probable cause for the
proceeding."79
In addition to tort liability, lawyers who bring frivolous or vexatious
lawsuits may face a host of statutory or procedural consequences. One
example is 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which provides that "[a]ny attorney . .. who so
multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be
required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and
attorney's fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct."so Courts have
also recognized their own inherent powers to sanction parties and their
with person or property and repeated civil actions that amount to harassment. See Feld Entm't,
Inc. v. Am. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 873 F. Supp. 2d 288, 332 n.25 (D.D.C.

(denying motion to dismiss malicious prosecution claim and holding that "where multiple
unconscionable suits were filed or where the unconscionability of the lawsuit was particularly
egregious, the courts have found that the costs of defending the suit may satisfy the special injury
requirement"). For example, in Feld, the court held that the special injury requirement was met
by "alleg[ations] that [Feld] was forced to defend a litigation which spanned nine years, was not
only baseless, but fraudulent from its outset, and was premised on bribery and other alleged
criminal activity." Id.
Abuse of process is defined in the Restatement of Torts as an act in which "one ... uses
73.
a legal process . .. against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 (AM. LAw INST. 1977).
LeahJ. Pollema, Beyond the Bounds of Zealous Advocacy: The PrevalenceofAbusive Litigation
74.
in Family Law and the Need for Tort Remedies, 75 UMKC L. REv. 1107, 1122 (2007).
75. Jeffrey J. Utermohle, Look What They've Done to My Tort, Ma: The Unfortunate Demise of
"Abuse of Process" in Maryland, 32 U. BALT. L. REv. 1, 7 (2002).
WARIN, supra note 35, § 34.02 (malicious prosecution); id. § 34.04 ("ulterior motive
76.
requirement" for abuse of process).
2012)

77.
78.
79.
80.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
Wade, supra note 22, at 448.

§ 682

(AM. LAw INST. 1997).

MALLEN & RHODES, supranote 64, § 6:42.
28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012); see also Kenneth Lasson, LawyeringAskew: Excesses in the Pursuit
ofFees andJustice, 74 B.U. L. REv. 723, 758 (1994) (discussing remedy).

20o16]

THE RICO TREND

181.

attorneys for acting "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive
reasons." 8' A required showing for each of these sanctions-and a key
distinction from a civil RICO claim-is bad faith.
Just as with the malicious-prosecution and abuse-of-process torts, tojustify
sanctions under section 1927 and a court's inherent powers to sanction, a
litigant must show that the "the attorney intentionally act[ed] without a
plausible basis." 82 This requirement is influenced by the same policy
consideration as the requirement of malice for malicious prosecution: the
need to protect access to courts. 83
In addition to section 1927 and inherent powers, there are sanctions
against frivolous lawsuits under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 11 requires attorneys who file cases in the federal courts to
certify that their claims, allegations, and arguments are made in good faith
and have some basis in law and fact.4 It forbids a party from filing any
litigation documents with the court that are "presented for any improper
purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the
cost of litigation." 85 Furthermore, by presenting to the court a litigation
document, attorneys represent that the legal arguments contained therein are
"warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending,
modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law." 86
Unlike sanctions under section 1927 and inherent powers, Rule ii does
not require a showing of subjective bad faith.87 Rule i i sanctions are still
carefully circumscribed to protect litigants' right to petition. First, the remedy
is limited to a sanction that suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or
comparable conduct by others similarly situated.8 8 Accordingly, when
monetary sanctions are granted under Rule i i, they usually must be paid to
the court.9 A court will require the violating party to compensate the
aggrieved party for the costs of defending a frivolous claim only in unusual
circumstances, including when sanctions aimed at deterrence may be
ineffective.9o Second, the Rule includes a safe-harbor provision that allows a
81.
Wade, supra note 22, at 469 (quoting Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y,
421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975)).
82. Id. at 472 n.179 (quoting Knorr Brake Corp. v. Harbil, Inc., 738 F.2d 223, 227 (7th
Cir. 1984)); see alsoMALLEN & RHODES, supranote 64, § 11:7.
83.
MALLEN &RHODES, supra note 6 , § 11:7.
4
84.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
85.
Id.11(b)(1).
86. Id. 11(b)(2).
87.
1 MALLEN & RHODES, supra note 64, § 11:6.
88.
FED. R. Civ. P. i1 advisory committee's notes to 1993 amendment. For available
sanctions under the Rule, see id. 11 (c) (4); 1 MALLEN & RHODES, supra note 64, § 1 1:6.
89.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes to 1993 amendment; HERR, supra note 2,

§ 10.154.
90.
For this reason, Rule 1 1 has been described as both a sanction and a fee-shifting
procedural device. Michael P. Stone & Thomas J. Miceli, The Impact of Frivolous Lawsuits on
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litigant the option to withdraw a challenged filing without sanction within 21
days after a challenge.s' The Advisory Committee stated that the purpose of
this rule is to allow litigants the freedom to "abandon a questionable
contention lest that be viewed as evidence of a violation of Rule 1 1."9
Defendants have used these tools in the past, including in asbestosis and
other related mass-tort litigation. Here the CSX case proves instructive. As
noted above,just six months before CSX filed its civil RICO action against the
Peirce law firm, Judge Jack issued sanctions in a federal silica MDL under
section 1927 for one law firm's vexatious and "unreasonable multiplication of
the proceedings."9s Specifically,JudgeJack sanctioned the plaintiffs' attorneys
because they kept prosecuting several cases even when it became clear to the
firm that the underlying diagnoses of their experts were unreliable.94 While
JudgeJack recognized that an $8,250 fine was "substantially less than the total
amount of damages-some calculable and some not-Plaintiffs' counsel have
caused by their filing of thousands of claims without a reliable basis for
believing that every Plaintiff has been injured," the court nonetheless found
this amount "sufficient to serve notice to counsel that truth matters in a
courtroom no less than in a doctor's office."9s

Attorneys practicing before the courts are also highly aware of potential
disciplinary proceedings which could be brought against them if they violate
the Rules of Professional Conduct. Attorneys have been disciplined in a
number of instances for misconduct in bringing frivolous or unwarranted civil
litigation.9 6 Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1 specifically prohibits
lawyers from making frivolous claims 97 and Model Rule 3.3 imposes a duty of
candor to the tribunal, which requires that an attorney make no knowingly
false statements of fact or law to the court.98
The foregoing review of the primary remedies available to combat
frivolous litigation reveals several insights. First, these remedies appear to
balance the competing interests at stake-access to courts versus deterring
frivolous litigation-primarily through employing both subjective and
objective elements of frivolousness and fraud. For most of these remedies, it
is not enough that the litigation was actually frivolous, but instead the plaintiff
must prove some type of bad faith. The obvious exception to this dual
objective/subjective requirement is Rule i1 sanctions, which only require a

Deterrence:Do They Have Some Redeeming Value?, ioJ.L. ECON. & POL'Y 301, 328 (2014).
91.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c) (2).
92.
FED. R. CIV. P. ii advisory committee's notes to 1993 amendment.
93.
In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 676 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
Id.
94.
95.
Id. at 679.
96.
See generally Susan L. Thomas, Bringing of Frivolous Civil Claim or Action as Ground for
Disciplineof Attorney, in 85 AM. L. REPS. 4TH 544 (1991) (compiling cases).

97.

MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2015).

98.

Id. r. 3.3.
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showing of objectively improper conduct. This makes Rule iI a strong tool
for judges to use to regulate the conduct in their courts. However, Rule 1 1
sanctions recognize the dangers inherent in any procedure that penalizes
litigation conduct without a showing of bad faith and have their own
protections built in.
This element-bad faith, or actual malice-is so intrinsic to the concept
of abusive litigation and attorney litigation conduct that a corresponding
attorney immunity has evolved to ensure protection for attorneys in precisely
these circumstances. In mostjurisdictions under the common law, lawyers are
absolutely immune from liability for conduct or communications "which may
injure or offend an opposing party during the litigation process."99 One of the
few narrow exceptions to have grown from this rule is liability for the torts of
abuse of process and malicious prosecution, which require more than a mere
showing of lack of truth, or slander, or misleading statements.-o The aim of
the litigation privilege is the same as that behind the effort to narrowly craft
the tort of malicious prosecution: to protect speech and the right of petition,
as "a contrary rule ... would unduly stifle attorneys from zealously advancing
the interests of their clients."Iol

Another insight resulting from research into these various methods of
preventing frivolous lawsuits is that perhaps none is, in isolation, adequate to
the task.os Each has been subject to criticism. For example, critics have
accused Rule I i's safe-harbor provision of destroying the deterrent effect of
its sanctions.os Despite this, there is still some teeth in the remedy, as courts
have their own discretion to impose sanctions and may waive the safe-harbor
requirements. And, as the silica litigation example shows above, the Rule 1 1
sanction can do more than simply offer compensation: it can also serve an
important role in detecting frivolous and specious claiming in mass tort
litigation.
The torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of process are subject to
even more critical commentary. Of primary concern are the onerous
restrictions state legislatures and courts have intentionally placed on the tort,
which result in "comparatively few cases in which it has been successfully

99.
Louise Lark Hill, The Litigation Privilege: Its Place in Contemporary jurisprudence, 44
HOFSTRA L. REv. 401, 401 (2015); see also Douglas R. Richmond, The Lawyer's Litigation Privilege,
31 AM.J. TRIALADVOC. 281, 284 (2007).

100.

Judith Kilpatrick, Regulatingthe LitigationImmunity: New Power and a Breath ofFresh Airfor

the Attorney DisciplineSystem, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1o6g, io86 (1992).

101.
T. Leigh Anenson, Absolute Immunity fom Civil Liability:Lessons for LitigationLawyers, 31
PEPP. L. REV. 915, 920 (2001) (quoting Surace v. Wuliger, 495 N.E.2d 939, 944 (Ohio 1986)).
102.
Johnson & Cassady, supra note 35, at 928 (stating that "no single device exists that
provides the defendant in a frivolous lawsuit with adequate relief").
See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Jeffrey S. Parker, No Armistice at ii: A Commentary on the
103.
Supreme Court's 1993 Amendment to Rule ii of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,3 SuP. CT. EcON.
REV. 93, 101 (1993) (arguing that the safe harbor provision incentivizes bad conduct by allowing
bad actors the chance to fix their bad conduct).
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maintained."104 Commentators often protest that, in the balance between the
policies of "freedom from harassment through vexatious proceedings" and
"open access to the courts," courts and legislatures have overwhelmingly
chosen to "weigh[] the balance on the side of encouraging lawsuits."1os The
most controversial requirements are the dual subjective and objective
elements and special damages.'o Furthermore, the fact that the maliciousprosecution action requires termination of the underlying lawsuit means that
a victim of vexation litigation must wait until the entire lawsuit-and
corresponding costs associated with its defense-is over before he can begin
to recover. A vexatious-lawsuit victim also has fewer options for ending the
prior action, as settlement and other resolutions not on the merits will
preclude a malicious-prosecution action.o7 When such a large percentage of
mass tort litigation ends in settlement, this can pose a significant hurdle.os
Ultimately, whether existing tort and procedural mechanisms designed
to controlling frivolous actions are adequate to that task is open to question.o9
It is especially unclear whether those remedial options are effective in the
aggregate litigation context. But the above analysis suggests, at least, that
there is a strongly perceived gap. Defendants seek to fill this gap by creating
a new remedy for frivolous litigation conduct in the context of aggregate
litigation-an action under civil RICO.
III.

CIVIL

RICO

BACKGROUND

This Part provides a brief background of the civil RICO statute. The next
Part explains how it is being deployed by defendants against plaintiffs'
attorneys in aggregate litigation.
Critics both laud and malign RICO, a statute that uses both criminal and
civil remedies to combat criminal organizations. Many authors have
recounted RICO's legislative andjudicial history,-o but a brief overview of the

Wade, supra note 22, at 454.
See, e.g., T. Leigh Anenson, CreatingConflicts ofInterest: Litigation As Interference with the
105.
Attorney-Client Relationship, 43 AM. Bus. L.J. 173, 206-07 (2oo6).
104.

1o6.

See id. at 208.

Wade, supra note 22, at 439.
See, e.g., Anenson, supra note 105, so6-o (arguing that these requirements have
resulted in little reduction of frivolous lawsuits).
Compare Wade, supra note 22, at 490 ("[A]lthough there are many different
10g.
approaches, no single one is fully adequate for the purpose. They are all incomplete and
imperfect, needing substantial improvement to become properly effective."), with Saami Zain,
Antitrust Liability for MaintainingBaseless Litigation, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 729, 756 (2014)
(reviewing "justifications for imposing antitrust liability for continuing to litigate a baseless action
for anticompetitive purposes").
See generally, e.g., G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil FraudAction in Context: Reflections on
110.
Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 237 (1982); G. Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An
Analysis of the Myths that Bolster Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposalsfor Reform: "Motherof
God-Is This the End of RICO?", 43 VAND. L. REV. 851 (1990); Pamela Pierson, RICO, Corruption
and White-Collar Crime, 85 TEMP. L. REv. 523 (2013).
107.
to8.
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statute and its expansion is necessary for an informed understanding of this
Article.
Since Congress enacted RICO in 1970 as Title IX of the Organized Crime
Control Act, critics have described it as "complex" and "amorphous.""' It is
both a criminal and a civil cause of action. The United States Department of
Justice may bring a civil enforcement action, or it may prosecute offenders
criminally," while private actors may sue for damages. Although the RICO
statute targets various types of conduct,"s plaintiffs bring "virtually all" RICO
claims against professionals, including attorneys, under § 1962(c)."4 That
section states that it is "unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise . .. to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity.""a
Those found civilly liable face tough sanctions. The civil provision grants
victorious RICO plaintiffs treble damages.- In addition, civil RICO contains
a fee-shifting provision-a rare exception in American jurisprudence.
Accordingly, prevailing RICO plaintiffs are also entitled to "the cost of the
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.",7 Both cost and attorneys' feesshifting and treble damages are mandatory upon a finding of liability. To put
this in the context of a RICO action claiming abusive litigation-plaintiffs
usually, at a minimum, seek damages of the attorneys' fees and costs to
prosecute the underlying abusive action. Not only would a losing defendant
have to pay these costs, times three, but it would also have to pay the prevailing
plaintiff its costs (including attorneys' fees) of prosecuting the entire federal
RICO claim-a notoriously complicated and costly action.
To prevail on a civil RICO claim, injured persons must prove that the
defendant: (i) conducted (2) "an enterprise" (3) "through a pattern" (4) "of
racketeering activity."" 5 The RICO statute lists a number of specific criminal
acts that constitute "racketeering activity."'' This list is exhaustive."o Mail and

iii.

Pierson, supranote 1 io, at 526.

Persons convicted of RICO violations may face up to 20 years in jail, forfeiture of
property "acquired or maintained in violation of" RICO, and fines. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1)
1 12.

(2012).

Such as investing, acquiring, or conspiracy. 2 RONALD E. MALLEN & ALLISON MARTIN
113.
RHODES, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 12:2 (2016).

114.

Id.

115.
1 16.

18U.S.C.§ 1962(C).
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
Id.

117.
118.

Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985).

11g.
18 U.S.C. § 1961(1); see also GREGORY P. JOSEPH, AM. BAR ASS'N, CIVIL RICO: A
DEFINITIVE GUIDE 134-37 ( 4 th ed. 2015).
120.

18 U.S.C.

§ i961(1)(2012).
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wire fraud are two common predicate offenses, especially in cases involving
professionals.121
A "pattern of racketeering activity" is defined in the statute as requiring
"at least two acts of racketeering activity ... the last of which occurred within
ten years ... after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity."'2
The Supreme Court has further narrowed the definition of a pattern by
holding that the two predicate acts must be "related, and that they amount to
or pose a threat of continued criminal activity."13 As the Fourth Circuit has
explained, this "continuity" requirement is meant to reflect Congress's desire
to limit RICO's application to "ongoing unlawful activities whose scope and
persistence pose a special threat to social well-being."
In addition to the basic elements, a person alleging civil RICO must also
prove the elements of the underlying predicate acts that make up the
racketeering pattern. RICO plaintiffs must also prove injury to business or
property-not to their person.125 In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., the Supreme
Court held that RICO plaintiffs must prove proximate cause because they may
only recover damages caused by the predicate acts, not incidental harms.'6
There is little debate about the immediate impetus for the RICO statute:
to combat organized crime.M'= Despite this original intent, Congress left the
door open for the expansion of RICO by mandating that RICO is to "be
liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." 28 Critics debate the
reason Congress included this "liberal construction" clause. Some argue that
Congress meant for RICO to apply beyond organized crime, to any type of
complex crime, including commercial and other fraud,'29 while others
124

See Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 191 (1997) (noting that mail and wire
121.
fraud are alleged as predicate acts in a "high percentage" of civil RICO claims).
122.
18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
123.
H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989) (emphasis in original).
Continuity is not a well-defined rule. For more on the definition, including the meaning of openended and closed-ended continuity, see idat 2 3 7- 4 3; JOSEPH, supra note 119, at 134-52.
Al-Abood v. El-Shamari, 217 F.3 d 225, 238 ( 4 th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations and
124.
citation omitted).
125.
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985).
Id.
126.
See Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context, supra note 1o, at 265-70 (citing
127.
legislative history). But see G. Robert Blakey & Michael Gerardi, Eliminating Overlap, or CreatingA
Gap?JudicialInterpretationof the Private Securities LitigationReform Act of 1995 and RICO, 28 NOTRE
DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 435, 443 (2014) ( "[T]he contention that RICO is limited to
'organized crime' finds no support in the Act's text, and . .
is at 'odds with the tenor of its
legislative history'" (quoting H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 244)).
128.
Act of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947.
One of the leading proponents of RICO expansion and its author, Professor G. Robert
129.
Blakey takes this view. See Blakey, supranote s io, at 28o (asserting that "Congress was well aware
that it was creating important new federal criminal and civil remedies in a field traditionally
occupied by common law fraud"); Blakey & Gerardi, supra note 127, at 445; see also Pamela Bucy
Pierson, RICO Trends: From Gangsters to Class Actions, 65 S.C. L. REV. 213, 221 (2013) (citing
committee reports and hearing transcripts to argue that Congress intended civil RICO to be "used
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suggest Congress merely left the statute vague to avoid potential constitutional
and vagueness challenges.so
Regardless of its intent, however, Congress allowed for expansion of the
RICO statute, and, with few exceptions, the Supreme Court has refused to
limit RICO's expansion.3 Although the Court has recognized that plaintiffs
are using RICO "in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress,"32 the
Court's position is that "this defect-if defect it is-is inherent in the statute
as written, and its correction must lie with Congress."'ss
As a result, plaintiffs have expanded RICO well beyond the Congressional
scope of combatting organized crime. "[C]ivil RICO claims have been raised
in actions relating to divorce, trespass, legal and accounting malpractice,
inheritance among family members, employment benefits, and sexual
harassment by a union." 34 A recent study shows that most often, businesses
use civil RICO against other businesses, with a significant majority of these
involving either "business deals gone bad-disagreements between former
business collaborators"-or lawsuits between business competitors.'s5
Anecdotal reports support this finding.'s 6 Only Lo% of civil RICO cases
"involve allegations of systemic wrongdoing by an organization or
organizations." 37
Numerous academics, courts, and some Supreme Court justices have
criticized the expansion of RICO. They point to the overuse of the statute in
areas that do not fit Congress's intent, and argue that Congress needs to
reform RICO so that plaintiffs and the courts apply it uniformly to its
'

originally intended-or at least its primary-target. Many have highlighted

the deleterious effects such expansion has on access to courts, federalism,
state common law, and the American system of justice. To the extent that
some of these arguments are relevant to aggregate litigation, they appear
below. Despite this chorus of RICO criticism, Congress has largely left in place
to combat sophisticated business frauds").
130.

See, e.g., Terrance G. Reed, The Defense Casefor RICO Reform, 43 VAND. L. REV. 691, 693

(199o) (citing legislative history).

Caroline N. Mitchell, Jordan Cunningham & Mark R. Lentz, Returning RICO to
131.
Racketeers: CorporationsCannot Constitute an Associated-in-FactEnterprise Under z8 U.S.C. § 1961(4),

13

FORDHAMJ. CORP. & FIN. L. 1, 34 (2oo8).

Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,499 (1985) (quoting Haroco, Inc. v. Am.
Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 398 ( 7 th Cir. 1984)).
Id.
133.
ChiefJustice William H. Rehnquist, Remarks of the ChiefJustice, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 5, 11
134.
(1989).
Pierson, supra note 129, at 221 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
135.
Susan Getzendanner, judicial "Pruning"of "Garden Variety Fraud" Civil RICO Cases Does
136.
Not Work: It's Time for Congress to Act, 43 VAND. L. REV. 673, 68o-81 (199o) (relying on author's
years of personal experience as a judge and litigator to observe that disputes involving only
predicate acts of mail fraud "are nothing more than commercial disagreements, well suited to
resolution under state laws in state courts").
132.

137.

Pierson, supra note 129, at 221 (citation omitted).
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the liberal-construction clause and far-reaching predicate offenses, even
though some of its members have attempted to reform the statute several
times.'3 8
IV.

THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE

This Part articulates and analyzes the use of civil RICO as a tool against
frivolous lawsuits in aggregate litigation. It examines the civil RICO reprisal
through the lens of illustrative cases. Two of these cases, CSX Transportation,
Inc. v. Gilkison'39 and the Garlock Sealing Technologies, LLO4o litigation, invoke
as predicates only allegations of fraudulent-litigation mailings and filingsi.e., mail and wire fraud to support some type of specious claiming scheme.
Other cases, which the next Part analyzes, involve other allegations of either
systemic or external wrongdoing. These cases show how civil RICO is being
deployed against plaintiffs' attorneys in aggregate litigation. They also provide
insight into the magnitude of the problem of frivolous litigation in the
aggregate
context,
and
help to define
the RICO reprisal.
The CSXcase was chosen as a model for several reasons. It is the only case
known to go to trial and result in a verdict for civil RICO violations solely
based on allegations of specious claiming. Further, because the case resulted
in ajury verdict, there is an extensive record, allowing in-depth analysis of the
legal arguments and evidence in the case. But CSXis not the only case to bring
RICO claims based on allegations of frivolous claiming by aggregate lawyers.
As will be explored more fully below, it is instead the case that has changed
the game, fully realizing an expanded scope of liability under civil RICO that
is not only unlawful but also has the potential to chill access courts.
A.

CSX AND THE RICO REPRiSAL MODEL

In December 2012, a jury returned a verdict in favor of CSX against
attorneys at Peirce Raimond & Coulter PC-a now-defunct law firm-for
common-law fraud and violations of civil RICO. According to CSX's
allegations, the Peirce firm filed thousands of claims in state courts over an
eight-year period against the rail carrier CSX on behalf of CSX employees or

138.
See, e.g., H.R. 5111, 1o1st Cong. § 5 (1990) (proposing a gatekeeper approach that
would have required courts to dismiss a RICO lawsuit except upon a prima facie showing of
appropriateness of relief, the extent of the defendant's participation, and the need for
deterrence); S. 438, 1o1st Cong. § 4 (1989) (proposing an amendment of the RICO statute to
eliminate automatic treble damages unless the defendant was convicted under criminal RICO);
see also Getzendanner, supra note 136, at 685-89 (cataloging and discussing recent legislative
efforts at RICO reform); Richard L. Grubb, Attorney Liability Under the FederalRico Statute: A Call
for Awareness in the Absence of Reform, 96 DICK. L. REV. 257, 268-72 (1992) (analyzing various
legislative proposals to amend the RICO statute). Consequently, RICO's overbreadth is at least
partly the result of Congress's failure to place limits on the statute. See Reed, supra note 13o, at
694-95.
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Gilkison, No. 5:05CV202, 2012 WL 1598081 (N.D.W. Va. May 3, 2012).
139.
140.
In reGarlock Sealing Techs., LLC., 504 B.R. 71 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2014).
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former employees, alleging asbestos-related personal injury and occupational
illness, such as asbestosis. In the RICO lawsuit, CSX accused the Peirce firm
of collaborating with co-defendant Dr. Ray Harron ("Dr. Harron") in a
scheme to produce false-positive diagnoses of asbestosis, which the firm then
used to support legal claims against CSX.'4' Discovery in a different case had

exposed weaknesses in Dr. Harron's diagnostic technique, including his
practices of conducting "mass screenings" composed of two-minute physical
examinations, relying on medical histories taken by non-medical screening
companies, and using untrained staff to prepare and "stamp his signature" on
his medical reports based on his notes.'14
At least in the context of asbestos litigation, many of the activities of Dr.
Harron and the Peirce firm are not unique. Indeed, "the use of mobile
screening units and the filing of 'mass lawsuits' are neither unlawful nor
unusual."143 Because of the unique nature of asbestos injuries and asbestos
litigation, these procedures are often the only realistic means of both making
workers exposed to asbestos aware of the harm done to them, and providing
access to the courts for compensation. Asbestos is a mineral made of rock that
was mass produced and mass consumed in America throughout the 2oth
century.144 Because of its unique characteristics-it is strong, durable, fire
retardant, and waterproof-asbestos use in manufacturing was widespread;
manufacturers incorporated it "in [to] everything from hair dryers to missile
silos, home gardening products, and children's modeling clay."145
Unfortunately, asbestos can be lethal. It is the only known cause of both
mesothelioma, "a deadly cancer of the lining of the chest or abdomen,"14 6 and
asbestosis, "a progressive and potentially fatal scarring of the lungs."'47
Researchers have also linked it with other diseases, such as lung and larynx
cancer. 148
Academics and scientists have described the scope of the asbestos crisis
as "staggering"'49 and "the worst occupational health disaster in U.S.
history."so During its peak years of consumption-from 1940 to 1979-"tens

Seegenerally Brief of Amicus Curiae American Ass'n forJustice in Support of Defendants141.
Appellants & Reversal, CSX Transp., Inc. v. Peirce, No. 13-2235, 201 4 WL 882782 ( 4 th Cir. Mar.
3, 2014).
142.
In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 602, 6o6 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
Brief of Amicus Curiae American Ass'n forJustice in Support of Defendants-Appellants
143.
& Reversal, supra note 141, at 2.
144. JEB BARNES, DUST-UP: ASBESTOS LITIGATION AND THE FAILURE OF COMMONSENSE POLIcY
REFORM 16-19 (2011); STEPHENJ. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION 11 (2005).
145.
146.

BARNES, supranote 144, at 17.

CARROLL, supra note 144, at xix.
BARNES, supra note 144, at 17.
Id.
148.
Id. at 19.
149.
CARROLL, supra note 144, at 12 (quoting Dennis Couchon, The Asbestos Epidemic: An
150.
Emerging Catastrophe USA TODAY 4 (Feb. 8, 1999)).
147.
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of millions of workers in high-risk industries and occupations ... were
exposed."s,' This includes the railroad industry,
of which CSX is a primary
member.
Furthermore, as with other cancer-causing agents, asbestos-related
diseases often have long latency periods-about 40 years.53 Some individuals
who have developed asbestos-related diseases may exhibit either low levels of
symptoms or be asymptomatic, even though they may develop more serious
symptoms later.54 Accordingly, it is often difficult to identify asbestos victims
and to predict the number of people with injuries. But "widely cited reports
estimate that asbestos-related cancers have caused between 55,ooo and
152

77,ooo deaths in the past thirty years."'ss

Doctors usually identify asbestos-related injuries via a combination of
X-rays, documented occupational exposure review, and clinical and
physiologic evaluation.15 6 However, when the disease is asymptomatic-as
asbestosis is in its mildest form-only a chest X-ray can detect it.57 "B-readers"
are doctors certified to review X-rays for signs of asbestosis or other asbestosisrelated diseases' 5 Reading X-rays for lung impairment is an inherently
subjective exercise: "[i]n any given case or even a set of hundreds of cases
involving the X-ray detection of pleural plaques or very mild asbestosis,
medical experts can and do differ in their interpretations of the X-rays."59
This is both because the quality of X-rays varies and because doctors must
search the X-ray to detect "the number of abnormalities (termed 'opacities')
in a given area of the chest film."6o What is an "abnormality" to one doctor
may look normal to another.
Whether these types of B-reader variations are due to "inherent interreader variability," to ethical improprieties, or to other factors is hotly
contested.' 6 ' The heart of the controversy-and the potential for abuse in

151.
152.

BARNES, supranote 144, at 17.
CARROLL, supra note 144, at 76.

153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 15.
Id.

157.

Brickman, supra note II, at 47-48.

158.

As explained by the court in the Silica multi-district litigation,

BARNES, supra note 144, at ig.

See CARROLL, supra note 144, at

14.

A "B-reading" is a physician's report of findings from a patient's chest radiograph
(i.e., an 'x-ray'). This report is entered on a standardized form using a classification
system devised by the International Labour Office ("ILO"). [The National Institute
for Occupational Safety and Health] issues "B-reader" certifications for physicians in
the United States. There are approximately 500-700 certified B-readers currently
practicing in the United States.
In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 581 n.28 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
159.

Brickman, supra note i 1, at 42.

16o.
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Id. at 47.
Id. at 96.
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litigation-comes from the subjective nature of the B-reader diagnosis.
Naturally, plaintiffs' attorneys filing mass actions tend to hire B-readers who
generate a higher percentage of lung-impaired diagnoses. 62 The fact that
there is some variation is not only natural, but expected. Even harsh critics of
these mass screenings agree.' 63 It is only natural that, given some variation in
results, plaintiffs' attorneys will act as zealous advocates and choose doctors
who tend to find more instances of harm.
That said, some B-readers generate numbers so far outside the normal,
that critics-with good reason-have questioned both their findings and the
attorneys' choice to employ them. The B-reader involved in CSX-Dr.
Harron-had a positive asbestosis diagnosis rate three to four times higher
than the Peirce firm's previous B-readers-a fact that evidence at trial showed
the Peirce firm was well aware of.' 6 4 Furthermore, Dr. Harron had a history
suggesting reasons to doubt his ethics. As noted above, in 2005, just six
months before CSX filed its civil RICO action, a U.S. District CourtJudge in
a federal MDL in the Southern District of Texas had issued sanctions against
a different law firm for using overly favorable experts to diagnose silicosisDr. Harron was one of these experts. 6s The court called Dr. Harron's
diagnoses "unreliable" and his procedures "distressing and disgraceful" and
"not remotely resemble [ing] reasonable medical practice."' 66
Judge Janis Graham Jack's opinion shook the foundation of asbestos
litigation.' 67 It was also the catalyst that led CSX to file its RICO claim against
the Peirce firm.' 68 CSX alleged that, just as in the Texas MDL case, the Peirce
firm knowingly and intentionally hired Dr. Harron in order to falsely identify
asbestos victims. 69 The specific allegations of the fraudulent scheme included
the following: (1) deliberately picking and paying experts-including Dr.

162.

See id. at 96-97.

163.

See id. at 42.

SeeJoint Appendix at 1297-330, CSX Transp. v. Peirce, 974 F. Supp. 2d 927 (N.D.W.
164.
Va. 2013) (No. 5 :0 5-CV-202); see alsoJoint Pre-Trial Order at 71, CSX Transp., Inc. v. Peirce, 974
F. Supp. 2d 927 (N.D.W. Va. 2013) (No. 5 :0 5 -CV-202) (evidencing Dr. Harron's rate of positive
diagnosis as 65%-70% overall).
In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 638, 675 (S.D. TeX. 2005).
165.
166.
Id. at 638.
See Mark A. Behrens, Whats New in Asbestos Litigation?, 28 REV. LITIG. 501, 513 (2009)
167.
(describing In re SilicaProductsLiabilityLitigation as a "landmark ruling"); Barbara Rothstein, Perspectives
on Asbestos Litigation:Keynote Address, 37 Sw. U. L REv. 733, 739 (2008) (stating that judges are now
alert for fraud by attorneys as a result of In re Silica.).
See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Gilkison, No. 5 :0 5 CV202, 2013 WL 85140, at *3 (N.D.W. Va.
168.
Jan. 7, 2013) (noting CSX's assertions to the court that "JudgeJack's opinion in the silicosis case
is the single most important fact in this litigation and pervades every aspect of it" and that it
"'triggered' CSX to bring this civil action"); Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 11-13; Third
Amended Complaint at ¶ 62, CSX Transp., Inc. v. Peirce, No. 5 :05 CV00202 (N.D.W. Va. 2013)
("Defendant Harron's misconduct in occupational illness cases was revealed for the first time by
the Honorablejanis G.Jack in the federal multidistrict silica litigation ... onJune 30, 2005.").
169.
Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 7.
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Harron-known to have impossibly high positive diagnosis rates; (2) sending
plaintiffs back for further screenings when their results came back "negative"
for asbestosis; (3) filling out forms and declarations for unknowledgeable
plaintiffs to sign (often without review); (4) soliciting plaintiffs through mass
advertising and screening; (5) filing "mass actions" that joined hundreds of
plaintiffs, presumably in part to increase leverage in the litigation;
(6) repeatedly filing motions in order to delay discovery in the litigation; and
(7) filing the plaintiffs' claims using the same vague, boilerplate complaints
in the same overburdened court system.7o
It is critical to note that much of this activity is quite legal. Despite its
grand claims of fraudulent activities, CSX identified only ii "baseless" claims
out of the 5300 claims filed by the Peirce law firm over the course of eight
years-or 0.2%.171 It also admitted in court that it could prove no other actual
instances of illegal conduct.172 Nevertheless, these 11 claims formed the basis
of CSX's civil RICO complaint against the Peirce law firm and Dr. Harron.
Specifically, CSX alleged that the Peirce firm committed mail fraud each time
it filed a complaint that included these 11 baseless claims and filed a
document in court or sent a letter to opposing counsel related to these
claims. 173
.A review of the case's Third Amended Complaint reveals that all the
alleged acts of mail or wire fraud are either communications to the court
about the i i claims (including both pleadings and letters to the court
regarding scheduling, mediation, and other matters) or communications with
opposing counsel about those claims.'74 Importantly, most of these "were not
even alleged to be fraudulent."75 For example, one of the "predicate acts" of
mail fraud alleged by CSX is a letter mailed to opposing counsel that forwards
Plaintiffs' Motion to Refer Cases to Mediation.'7 6 Another example is a
Petition to the Supreme Court for a Writ of Certiorari that the Peirce firm
filed on behalf of plaintiffs in one of the underlying mass actions, challenging

170.

See generally id.

171.

See supranote

i

and accompanying text.

SeeMotion in Limine No. 7 by Defendants Robert N. Peirce,Jr. & Louis A. Raimond to Limit
CSX's Damage Claims & Evidence to Alleged Damages Specifically Related to the Eleven Claims at
Issue at 2, CSX Transp., Inc. v. Peirce, No. 5 :05 CV00202 (N.D.W. Va. 2013).
172.

173.

Third Amended Complaint, supra note 168, at

f 90,

94, 105, 112, 125, 129, 134, 159.

"In this case, the predicate acts alleged are instances of mail and wire fraud, which include the
filing and service of mass lawsuits, as well as all of the actions taken by the lawyer defendants to
generate medical evidence in support of the fraudulent claims." CSX Transp., Inc. v. Gilkison,
No. 5 :0 5 CV202, 2012 WL 1598081, at * io (N.D.W. Va. May 3, 2012).
Id. at *14 (citing Third Amended Complaint, supra note s68, at 11 105, 112, 125, 129,
174.
134, 147, 159-60).
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the lower court's dismissal of the action for improper venue.77 In other
words, routine litigation documents, such as a simple letter providing a
courtesy copy of a request to mediate and an effort to appeal an unfavorable
procedural motion, served as a partial basis for transforming this lawsuit from
a run-of-the-mill malicious-prosecution action to federal racketeering.
There are several doctrinal problems with CSX's RICO allegations. First
are the issues of relatedness and continuity. Eleven instances of mail fraud
over the course of eight years is a dubious foundation for the relatedness and
continuity that the Supreme Court requires to assert a RICO claim. For
predicate acts to be related, they must not be "isolated events."7 8 It is
impossible to imagine a scenario where filing mass actions with 0.2% error
rate can qualify as more than "isolated" errors.
Even the district court acknowledged this in CSX79 Nevertheless, the

court refused to dismiss CSX's RICO claims, holding that the predicate acts
of racketeering were not the 11 fraudulent individual cases, but instead were
"the mass suits themselves."'so The court held that these mass suits, along with
"numerous other acts of mail and wire fraud" were alleged to be "part of a
grander plan to conceal the fraudulent claims."',8 CSX alleged that the Peirce
firm "deliberately filed ... mass lawsuits in overburdened courts to deprive
CSXT of access to meaningful discovery, which in turn concealed fraudulent
claims and leveraged higher settlements based on the threat of mass trials."1 8 2

By acknowledging that the continuity and relatedness issues hinged on the
court's expanded definition of the predicate acts,'8 s the district court
effectively conceded that the 11 lawsuits themselves were not sufficient to
establish a pattern of racketeering. 8 4 As amicus noted, "[w]hat turned the ii
isolated false claims into a pattern, CSXT [successfully] alleged, was the filing
of a large number of entirely legitimate cases as part of a system of fraud." 85
CSX faced another problem with the issue of damages. As noted above,
after Sedima, the recoverable RICO injury must "flow from the commission of
the predicate acts." 86 Thus, the lower court's decision to expand the
predicate acts to include the entire mass actions, rather than just the ii
baseless claims, drastically expanded the injury that could be compensated in
that case. Specifically, it provided the opening CSX needed for claiming

Id. at 1i 128, 158, 16o.
H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 240 (1989).
CSX Transp. Inc., 2012 WL 1598081, at*13.
Id.
Id. at* 13-14.
Id. at *11 (quoting Third Amended Complaint, supra note 168, at 1 19).
Id. at *1 3
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184.
& Reversal, supra note 141, at 7-8.
Id. at 8.
185.
186. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex CO., 473 U.S. 479, 497 (1985).
.
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181.
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damages for the cost of defending notjust the 11 allegedly fraudulent claims,
but the cost of defending the entire mass actions-times three.'5 7
Recognizing this issue, the Peirce firm filed a motion in limine requesting
that the court limit the damage claims and evidence at trial to "alleged
damages specifically related to the i i claims at issue."'88 CSX had admitted in
a prior hearing that the i i specific claims were "the only claims from which
we can attempt to prove fraud and from which we can attempt to prove
damages." 8 9 Therefore, the Peirce firm argued, CSX could prove neither
causation nor reliance in order to peruse the cost of the full mass actions
because those costs "would have been incurred by CSX regardless of the
presence of the 11 claims."go By trying to put on evidence of the full cost of
the mass actions, the Peirce firm asserted, CSX was attempting to "improperly
pad its recoverable damages and then try and triple those padded
damages.",'9
The court denied the motion in part and granted in part.19 2 The court
granted the motion as to the common law fraud claims, acknowledging that
CSX did, "by its admissions," limit its claims for damages under common law
fraud.193 However, the court denied the motion related to CSX's federal RICO
claim. As to that, the court held that CSX would be allowed the opportunity
at trial "to assert claims under RICO and damages that might possibly arise
from proof of predicate acts."94 The obvious take-away from the court's ruling
is that, while state fraud claims need a direct tie between the intended fraud
and liability/recovery, federal RICO claims have a potentially larger reach,
allowing recovery for actions far beyond the proven fraudulent conduct.
Considering the devastating impact this ruling had on the Peirce firm's
exposure to liability, it should be unsurprising that just nine days after the
court issued this order, and four days into the eight-day trial, the Peirce firm
stipulated to the amount of attorneys' fees and costs incurred by CSX in
defense of the 1 1 asbestosis claims as $429,24o.47,'95 just under the
6
$463,111-47 CSX initially indicated it would seek at trial.'9 After the jury
187.
See Amended Complaint, supranote 1, at ¶[ 57, 75, 84, 99, 113-14, 121.
188.
Motion in Limine No. 7 by Defendants Robert N. Peirce, Jr. & Louis A. Raimond to
Limit CSX's Damage Claims & Evidence to Alleged Damages Specifically Related to the Eleven
Claims at Issue, supra note 172, at i.
189.
Id. at 2.
190.
Id. at 3.
191.
Id.
192.
Memorandum Opinion & Order Confirming the Pronounced Rulings of this Court
Relating to Lawyer Defendants' Motions in Limine at 13-14, CSX Transp., Inc. v. Peirce, No.
5 :05 CV00202 (N.D.W. Va. 2013).
193.
Id. at 14.
Id.
194.
195.
Stipulation Regarding Damages at i, CSX Transp., Inc. v. Peirce, No. 5 :o 5 -CV-202

(N.D.W. Va. Dec
196.

22, 2005).
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returned a verdict in favor of CSX, the court trebled this amount to $1.3 million
as required by RICO.'97 The jury's verdict also opened the door to CSX's
motion to obtain the over $io million in attorneys' fees and expenses it had
incurred in prosecuting the RICO action, as required under RICO.1o 8 Before
this motion could be heard, the parties settled the case for $7.3 million.199
In summary, the CSX case is unique in that many aspects turned entirely
on the Peirce firm's choice to bring its clients' claims through a mass action
device. If, instead, the firm had somehow filed the claims individually-an
impossible reality given the costs of litigation-it is highly unlikely that the
RICO claims would have survived. But, as the Peirce firm argued, "[u] tilizing
the procedural device of a mass suit is not fraud."2- This theme-the use of
RICO to attack aggregate litigation itself-will be explored more fully below.
B.

OTI-ER EXAMPLES OF USE OFRICOAGAINSTAGGREGATE-LITIGA TION
PLAINTIFs'ATTORNEYs

CSX is part of a small but rising number of cases by defendants using
RICO against plaintiffs' attorneys based on litigation activities in aggregate
litigation. A strikingly similar example is a series of RICO actions filed by
gasket maker Garlock Sealing Technologies, LLC ("Garlock") against several
law firms for their alleged scheme to inflate asbestos claims artificially against
the company prior to its 201o bankruptcy. After Garlock suffered significant
losses in asbestos litigation brought by multiple plaintiffs represented by
different law firms, it commenced bankruptcy proceedings.201 In those
proceedings, United States Bankruptcy Judge George R. Hodges held a
hearing to estimate Garlock's future liabilities related to asbestos victims.2o2

To support an estimation of future liability, the judge ordered discovery of 15
closed cases against Garlock.2o3 After the hearing, Judge Hodges determined
Garlock was only liable for $125 million in asbestos claims, about one-tenth
of the total sought by plaintiffs' attorneys for outstanding asbestos
claimants.204 The judge ruled that the settlement of all 15 cases had been
"infected with the impropriety of some law firms."-so Although the judge did
Limit CSX's Damage Claims & Evidence to Alleged Damages Specifically Related to the Eleven
Claims at Issue, supra note 172, at 2.
3 Defendants in Asbestos Fraud Conspiracy Agree to $7.3 Million Settlement: CSX Trans. v.
197.
Peirce, supranote 1, at 4; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012) (treble damages provision).
198.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (allowing recovery of attorney's fees).

199.

Field, supra note 1.

.

200.
Motion in Limine No. 7 by Defendants Robert N. Peirce, Jr. & Louis A. Raimond to
Limit CSX's Damage Claims & Evidence to Alleged Damages Specifically Related to the Eleven
Claims at Issue, supra note 172, at 4.
201.
In reGarlock Sealing Techs., LLC., 504 B.R. 71, 73 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2014).
202.
See id. at 7 3
203.

See id. at 8 4
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not name the firms, he made findings that some plaintiffs' attorneys had
concealed evidence of exposure to asbestos products other than Garlock's in
discovery responses in order to "unfairly inflat[e] the recoveries against
Garlock."2o6

Although

the court took pains

to note

it "ma[de]

no

determination of the propriety of that practice," it did call the practice
"sufficiently widespread to render Garlock's settlements unreliable as a
predictor of its true liability."207
The day before Judge Hodges issued his order, Garlock brought five
separate RICO actions against five plaintiffs' firms-Waters & Kraus LLP,
Stanley-lola LLP, Belluck & Fox LLP, Simon Greenstone Panatier Bartlett PC,
and Shein Law Center Ltd.-accusing each of a fraudulent scheme "to inflate
settlements paid by Garlock and other asbestos manufacturers."208 just as in
CSX the predicate racketeering acts alleged were mail fraud, based purely on
the filing of litigation documents in the underlying aggregate state tort
litigation-specifically, the law firms' service of responses to discovery that
failed to disclose their clients' exposure to non-Garlock asbestos products.209
Similar to CSX the fact that the plaintiffs' firms brought these asbestos
claims as part of an aggregate litigation strategy is vital to the RICO claims in
Garlock. Although Garlock used individual cases as examples of the alleged
concealment of evidence in each Complaint, the RICO allegations in fact
target the broader "scheme" to use the parallel bankruptcy and tort
procedures "to create a high cost/high risk litigation environment for
Garlock."-1o Garlock alleges that, "[b]y concealing many of their individual
clients' exposures" to non-Garlock potential asbestos products, "Defendants
created the prospect of enormous aggregate defense costs for Garlock. "211
206.

Id. at 86.

at 87.
Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion to Dismiss of Defendants Shein Law Center, Ltd.,
Benjamin P. Shein, Esquire & Bethann Schaffzin Kagan, Esquire at 1, Garlock Sealing Techs.
LLC v. Shein Law Ctr., LTD., No. 3 :1 4 -CV-oo1 3 7-GCM-DSC (W.D.N.C. NOV. 24, 2014). Garlock
has entered into a preliminary settlement of its RICO claims with Simon Greenstone and the
other plaintiffs' firms contingent on the resolution of the Garlock bankruptcy matter;
accordingly, at the time of publication, the cases have been stayed. See generallyJoint Motion for
Stay of All Proceedings Pending Approval & Consummation of Settlement in Connection with
Consensual Plan, Garlock Sealing Techs. LLC v. Simon Greenstone Panatier Bartlett, P.C., No.
FederalJudgeAgrees to Stay
3 :1 4 -CV-1i6-GCM-DSC (W.D.N.C. Mar. 21, 2016); Jessica Karmasek,
RICO Cases Against Asbestos Plaintiffs Firms, LEGAL NEWS LINE (Mar. 29, 2016, 12:39 PM),
http://legalnewsline.com/stories/ 5
o0704392-federal-judge-agrees-to-stay-rico-cases-againstasbestos-plaintiffs-firms. However, at least two of these plaintiffs' firms-Simon Greenstone and
Shein Law-have since been subject to RICO lawsuits from another company based on similar
theories.John O'Brien, Despite Garlock Settlement, Asbestos Lawyers Can'tShake Recketeering Claims Yet,
LEGAL NEWS LINE (June 8, 2016, 9:2o AM), http://legalnewsline.com/stories/510793115despite-garlock-settlement-asbestos-lawyers-can-t-shake-racketeering-claims-yet.
209.
See generally Complaint, Garlock Sealing Techs. LLC v. Shein Law Ctr., LTD., No. 3: 14-ap03035 (Bankr. W.D.N.C.Jan. g, 2014).
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The firms also allegedly "created the illusion of liability risk across multiple
claims"-12 and used that leverage to "compel Garlock to enter into group
settlements in which Garlock paid higher amounts to large numbers of their
clients than it would have paid in the absence of the Scheme."213 In short,

Garlock accuses the firms not only of misrepresenting the value of claims in
individual cases-and thus falsely inflating the value of those cases-but doing
so in order to further a scheme to inflate the value of all tort cases brought
against Garlock.14
This strategy mirrors the accusations in CSX Most importantly, Garlock's
allegations suggest that, like CSX, Garlock will seek to prove and obtain
damages for notjust the inflated settlements in the individual cases that it can
prove contained misrepresentations, but for other damages related to the
broader "scheme," perhaps including all of the others it settled as a result of
the alleged "illusion of liability risk across multiple claims."215 United States
DistrictJudge Graham C. Mullen appears willing to endorse this approach. In
his orders denying the motions to dismiss the RICO claims,2,6Judge Mullen
noted that Garlock accused the defendants of "rampant fraud," and quoted
from the bankruptcy judge's decision that this fraud "appears to have been
sufficiently widespread to have a significant impact on Garlock's settlement
practices and results."217 ShouldJudge Mullen follow the CSXcourt's lead and
define the predicate acts as the wider scheme to manipulate the bankruptcy
trust and state tort cases, a significant amount of money could be at stake.
Despite these similarities, subsequent developments in the Garlock case
suggest that the attorneys in Garlock have been watching cases like CSX and
are developing new defense strategies. For example, one of the defendants in
the Garlock case-Simon Greenstone-recently filed a counterclaim against
Garlock, alleging its own claims for RICO, abuse of process, and fraudulent
inducement.18 The firm alleges that Garlock filed its RICO claim as part of a
scheme to defraud Simon Greenstone in order to "gain improper leverage
against Simon Greenstone in the Garlock bankruptcy by putting Simon
Greenstone at financial risk with threats of economic harm through the
damages pled in the RICO lawsuit and by damaging Simon Greenstone's

212.

Id.

213.

Id.

214.
For a thorough study of the asbestosis litigation and arguments about the fraud and
manipulation of the same, see generally Brickman, supra note 25.
Complaint, supra note 209, at¶ 58.
215.
216.
Only Shein and Simon filed motions to dismiss. At least one of the defendant law
firms-Simon Greenstone-is pursuing an aggressive defensive strategy that might throw a
wrench into this. Simon Greenstone's motion includes a SLAPP claim. Simon Greenstone also
filed a counterclaim for RICO, abuse of process, and fraudulent inducement
217.
Order at 5, Garlock Sealing Techs. LLC, v. Shein, No. 3:14-cv-137 (W.D.N.C Sept. 02,
2015) (denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim).
218.
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reputation."13 Simon Greenstone has not hid its motives in filing this
counterclaim: it stated in its complaint that it was acting "to protect its rights
against Garlock in the event that it is determined that Garlock's own
representations in litigation constitute RICO predicate acts."2o
CSX and Garlock represent a new trend-a trend by defendants in
aggregate litigation to "punish" aggregate litigation abuse by plaintiffs'
attorneys through civil RICO. But the use of civil RICO against plaintiffs'
attorneys is not new. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger exemplifies a more traditional
use of RICO to regulate plaintiffs' attorneys.2 2' In an environmental
class-action lawsuit based in Ecuador, plaintiffs' attorneys secured an
historical $9.5 billion judgment against Chevron based on its subsidiary's
actions in causing oil pollution in the Ecuadorean Amazon.222 To avoid
enforcement of that Ecuadorianjudgment in the United States, Chevron filed
a civil RICO action in the Southern District of New York, arguing that the
plaintiffs' attorneys used bribes to influence several court orders and
ghostwrite a pivotal court expert's report.22 3 Judge Lewis A. Kaplan of the
Southern District of NewYork agreed, issuing an injunction against enforcing
of the Ecuadorian judgment in the United States, and holding that the
plaintiffs' attorneys' actions amounted to extortion, mail and wire fraud,
money laundering, witness tampering, and obstruction of justice, all predicate
acts under the RICO statute.2 2 4 The judge also ordered a constructive trust,
requiring plaintiffs' attorneys to "pay over and assign to Chevron all fees and other
payments, property, and other benefits that they have received or hereafter
receive, directly or indirectly, in consequence of the Judgment."225 Finally, as
required under RICO, the court ordered the plaintiffs' attorneys to pay Chevron's
costs to prosecute the RICO action, which allegedly run to $32 million.226
Chevron, like CSX and Garlock, involved an action against plaintiffs'
attorneys seeking the extraordinary remedies allowed under RICO based on
their underlying conduct in aggregate litigation. Commentators have
suggested that these cases should be viewed together as part of the new

219.
220.

Id. at 64.
Id. at 23 n.i.
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strategy to "fight back" against abuses in aggregate litigation conduct. But
there is an important difference between CSX and Garlock, on the one hand,
and Chevron, on the other. In CSX the procedure that plaintiffs' attorneys
used in the underlying litigation-that is, a mass action-served as the
foundation for the RICO elements. Without the mass action, it is unlikely that
there would have been a sufficient "pattern" of racketeering activity because
the very decision to bring a few baseless claims as part of a mass action was the
racketeering activity in the case. That also appears to be true for Garlock, where
Garlock alleges that inadequate discovery responses infected an entire system
of asbestos tort and bankruptcy litigation.
But there is less of a connection between the aggregate litigation device
and the RICO cause of action in Chevron. Unlike CSX and Garlock, the
underlying racketeering conduct in Chevron included more than simply
litigation activities, such as filing complaints or documents; it also included
activities like extortion, bribing, and witness tampering. This kind of conduct
provides strong evidence of bad faith on the part of the attorneys involved in
the litigation and thus raises a different set of questions about the propriety
of holding attorneys accountable under RICO.
This difference also shows that cases like Chevron are, in fact, not "new."
Courts have long grappled with the application of RICO to attorneys, and
have historically held that attorneys may be liable under RICO for the actions
in furtherance of a pattern of unlawful racketeering activity.227 In the past,
courts have limited attorneys' liability under RICO for litigation conduct to
cases involving systemic wrongdoing and cases like Chevron that involve
wrongdoing "external to, and independent of' the underlying disputes.22 8
One example is United States v. Eisen, a Second Circuit case involving criminal
RICO convictions of lawyers and law firm employees for their participation in
their firm's scheme to litigate and settle fraudulent personal injury lawsuits.229
In addition to staging accidents and exaggerating injuries, the defendants
committed numerous predicate acts of both bribery and mail fraud, including
routinely bribing and paying witnesses to testify falsely, paying unfavorable
witnesses not to testify, and creating false evidence for use before and during
trial.2so Although the court in Eisen noted the "understandable reluctance" on
227.
See 2 MALLEN & RHODES, supra note 113, § 12:8-17 (describing attorneys' exposure
under RICO); H. Robert Fiebach, A Chillingof the Adversary System: An Attorney's Exposure toLiability
from Opposing Parties or Counsel, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1301, 1315-20 (1988) (analyzing the "recent
and increased use of malpractice claims" against attorneys).
228.
Curtis & Assocs., P.C. v. Law Offices of David M. Bushman, Esq., 758 F. Supp. 2d 153,
174-76 (E.D.N.Y. solo), affd sub nom. Curtis v. Law Offices of David M. Bushman, Esq., 443 F.
App'x 582 (2d Cir. 2011); see alsoFiebach, supra note 227, at 1316 (summarizing onejudge's test
for requiring additional "nefarious conduct" as an "I know it when I see it" test).
229.
United States v. Eisen, 974 F.2d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Arnold H. Lubasch,
Jury Finds Law Firm Ran Racket, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/
1991/03/05/nyregion/jury-finds-law-firm-ran-racket.html (reporting on evidence at Eisen trial).
230.
Eisen, 974 F.2d at 251. "The four-month trial ... [included] evidence showing that the
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the part of Congress "to use federal criminal law as a back-stop for all state
court litigation," it nevertheless found liability, noting that the RICO
"scheme" was based not on "perjuries alone."231

Even though courts permitted RICO actions against attorneys, they
consistently held that litigation activities, by themselves, could not constitute
predicate acts under RICO before CSX2s2 They have rejected RICO actions
based solely on "litigation" activities-such as serving litigation documents,
mailing letters to opposing counsel, filing memoranda in opposition to
motions, and filing "unjustified," "phony," or "malicious" suitscharacterizing them as more properly malicious prosecution or abuse of
process actions.2 33
V.

THE RICO REPRIsAL-ANALYsIs

Having fully examined the RICO reprisal, frivolous litigation-both in
general and in the context of aggregate litigation-and the primary existing
remedies for frivolous litigation, this Article now turns to the RICO reprisal's
implications. This Part argues that the RICO reprisal avoids legitimate state
protections for litigation activity and threatens to overpenalize state-common
law torts, including by allowing claimants to label their litigation opponents
as "mobsters" and avoid stringent pleading requirements and particularized
elements. The reprisal also results in the lamentable federalization of state
common law and leads to improper forum shopping. Finally, this use of RICO
threatens to elevate Rule i i violations to federal tort, and punishes the
aggregate litigation device itself.

defendants had smashed a tire rim with a sledgehammer to exaggerate an automobile accident,
used a pickax to enlarge a pothole and bribed a witness to give the same testimony in two different
cases." Lubasch, supra note 2 29.
231.
Eisen, 974 F.2d at 254. See also Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Stites, 258 F. 3 d 1016, loig
(9th Cir. 2001) (holding that an attorney could be held civilly liable under RICO for
masterminding a network of attorneys designed to defraud insurance companies where the
defendant created and controlled an "alliance" of attorneys on both sides of major lawsuits,
thereby ensuring "that plaintiffs would not settle until late in the litigation" and "enabling defense
lawyers to accumulate substantial attorneys' fees").
232.
See Curtis &Assocs., 758 F. Supp. 2d at 174-76.
233.
Of course, the line between "solely litigation activities" and "something more" is far
from clear. As an example, in denying the Peirce Firms' motion to dismiss CSX's RICO claims,
the court distinguished the RICO claims by noting that CSX alleged "more than mere claims for
abuse of process or malicious prosecution," because it involved the "generat[ion of] medical
evidence in support of the fraudulent claims." CSX Transp., Inc. v. Gilkison, No. 5:0 5 CV202,
2012 WL 1598081, at *6, *io (N.D.W. Va. May 3, 2012). But this makes this case no different
from other RICO contexts, where courts have struggled to determine when a case deserves the
special remedy of RICO, and when it, conversely, is reflective of a garden variety wrong. Any
confusion on this point is further evidence that courts require guidance on the issue.
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EXPANSION OFRICO To CovER GARDEN-VARmTY WRONGS

The expansion of civil RICO to transform it into a malicious-prosecution
action threatens to over-penalize garden-variety wrongs. Although critics have
made this argument in other RICO-expansion contexts, applying it to the
RICO reprisal reveals that the reprisal allows plaintiffs to bring a federal
abusive litigation tort in the aggregate litigation context that is characterized
by weaker pleading and burdens of proof, and yet significantly higher
damages.
Because CSX involves a dispute between opposing parties, it is illustrative
of the broader trend in the competitive use of civil RICO. As former Judge
Susan Getzendanner observed, business competitors routinely use mail- and
wire-fraud predicates to characterize discrete acts of wrong as part of a larger
scheme to defraud.34 CSX utilized its litigation opponent's everyday
exchanges in litigation-including courtesy mailings of routine litigation
documents and service of pleadings-to transform what is in essence a
malicious-prosecution action into a federal action. It is easy to see why
litigation opponents-like business competitors-can be particularly
vulnerable to RICO claims based on mail and wire fraud. With the widespread
use of mail and telephones in everyday business actions, including in
litigation, almost any fraud can be easily transformed into a RICO action.2 35
There are serious repercussions to this reality. One of the most oft-cited
criticisms of the civil RICO action is that it improperly paints people who
commit garden-variety wrongs as "mobsters" and "racketeers." As the First
Circuit explained, "[c] ivil RICO is an unusually potent weapon-the litigation
equivalent of a thermonuclear device. The very pendency of a RICO suit can
be stigmatizing and its consummation can be costly." 236 Another court
observed that "[b]oth the potential financial rewards for plaintiffs, and the
stigma that may attach to RICO defendants, make the statute a powerful
weapon for aggrieved parties."237 In the aggregate-litigation context, a
plaintiffs' attorney thinking of taking on a case will have to consider the cost
of the stigma of being labeled a "racketeer" by a follow-up RICO action as part
of the cost-benefit analysis.
Furthermore, because of RICO's treble damages, attorneys' fees, and
costs provisions, the use of RICO to usurp state common-law claims also
inflates the potential damages available to plaintiffs able to repackage their
claims as federal RICO claims. This is particularly troubling when commonGetzendanner, supra note 136, at 68o-8i.
"Given the prevalence of mail and wire use in commercial transactions, RICO's
235.
provision for a private cause of action predicated on violations of the mail and wire fraud statutes
virtually federalizes common law fraud." Tabas v. Tabas, 47 F. 3 d 128o, 1290 ( d Cir. 1995)
3
(quoting Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety ofjudicialRestriction, 95 HARv. L. REV.
234.

1101, 1105 (1982)).
236.
237.

Mirandav. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1991).
DLJ Mortg. Capital v. Kontogiannis, 726 F. Supp. 2d 225, 236 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
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law torts like malicious prosecution are specifically tailored to address the
harm at issue. In state court, CSX could have obtained, at most, the
underlying cost and attorney's fees CSX expended in defending itself against
the 1 1 baseless claims. But, since CSX brought the lawsuit as a federal RICO
reprisal, that amount is trebled, plus CSX is entitled to the costs and attorneys'
fees it took to defend itself in the RICO lawsuit. The civil RICO claim
therefore inflates the damages considerably in excess of the amount
considered appropriate by state policymakers to remedy this very type of
conduct.
Not only are the potential damages significantly higher, but they are
automatic. Treble damages, costs, and attorneys' fees are mandatory once the
plaintiff establishes liability and the extent of the harm. Unlike at common
law, once the RICO plaintiff proves the underlying damages, the jury, the
judge, or the parties have no discretion to take into account discrete policy
issues or varying levels of culpability. RICO's mandatory damages are
especially dangerous, because courts hold the prevailing view that the jury
cannot be informed of the fact that RICO damages will be trebled.238
Therefore, a jury attempting to determine "reasonable" damages will not
know the full extent of the defendant's ultimate liability stemming from its
decision.
The CSX case clearly demonstrates this concept. CSX pled and proved
common-law fraud in addition to civil RICO liability. The jury found in favor
of CSX on both counts, but only granted CSX compensatory damages on the
RICO claim.1s9 This was likely because the court had instructed the jury to
consider a single amount-a maximum of $429,240.47 in damages-should

it find in favor of CSX on "any or all counts."24o Although it is unclear why the
jury chose to award the damages under the RICO claim, as opposed to the
common-law fraud claim,'4' the impact cannot be overstated. Not only did

this decision lead to the automatic right to treble damages and cost-shifting,
but these consequences were also likely unknown to the jury. The CSX jury
instructions made no mention of the fact that the court would treble any
damages awarded under the RICO claims, nor did they discuss cost shifting.242

238.

239.

JOSEPH, supra note 159, at 256.
See generally Verdict, CSX Transp., Inc. v. Peirce, No. 05 -CV-O0202 (N.D.W. Va. Dec. 20,

2012).

240.

Final Civil Jury Instructions at 35, CSX Transp., Inc. v. Peirce, No. 0 5 -CV-O0202

(N.D.W. Va. Dec. 20, 2012). The parties stipulated to this amount prior to trial.
241.
One possibility is that the jury did not believe that CSX proved the necessary causation
element for the s1claims at issue. This is a real possibility because, as noted above, the court ruled in
limine that CSX could not seek damages for the full mass actions under its common law fraud claim,
but it could seek the broader scope of damages at trial under its civil RICO claims. See supra notes
188-94 and accompanying text. If this is true, that thejury awarded CSX damages under RICO without
believing that any particular damages could be attributable to the predicate acts, then it would clearly
fly in the face of Supreme Court precedent and raise troubling due process concerns.
242.
See generally Final Civil Jury Instructions, supra note 240.
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Parties like CSX that bring their malicious-prosecution claims as civil
RICO actions in federal court are also able to circumvent the usual pleading
requirements of malicious prosecution and other state torts. For example, to
prevail on a malicious-prosecution claim under state law, CSX would have had
to prove that the 11 underlying "baseless" asbestosis cases terminated in CSX's
favor.24s But CSX could not meet such a requirement; it acknowledged in its
Third Amended Complaint that most of these claims were either still pending
at the time of the initial suit24 or were terminated forjurisdictional reasons.245
Some even resulted in settlement.24 6 None of these dispositions constitute
"favorable termination" under the law.247 CSX's ability to avoid this pleading
requirement is especially troubling because it is designed to provide
protections for litigants like the Peirce firm who have sought redress in the
courts. As explained above, the favorable-termination requirement was
crafted as part of the larger state effort to ensure the proper balance between
access to courts and prevention of frivolous litigation by providing extra
protection for meritorious claims.24 8 Any arbitrary deletion of one of these
requirements threatens to upset this balance.
By bringing its state malicious prosecution action as a federal RICO
action, CSX also avoided a potential statute of limitations time bar. CSX had
only one year to bring a state malicious-prosecution action under West
Virginia state law,249 but it had four years to bring its RICO action.250 Despite
obvious forum-shopping concerns, federal courts have permitted plaintiffs to
bring RICO claims that mirror state-law claims that would be time barred
under state law.2s
Choosing to bring a civil RICO claim in federal court not only bypasses
more stringent pleading requirements and provides higher damage awards
than state tort law, in some circumstances it allows for a lower burden of proof.
For example, plaintiffs who bring state-court fraud cases must meet a clear
See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
The claims of "Miledge Hill, James Petersen, A. Lewis Schabow, Aubrey Shelton and
244.
Donald Wiley ... remained pending until June 14, 2010," five years after CSX filed its original
complaint. Third Amended Complaint, supra note 168, at I 1 4 7 b.
The claim of Charles Abbott was dismissed for venue reasons. Id. at I 128.
245.
Morris Collier settled his claim with CSX two years before the CSX RICO litigation. Id.
246.
at I 147a.
See generally Vitauts M. Gulbis, Nature of Termination of Civil Action Required to Satisfy
247.
Element ofFavorable Termination to Support Action for MaliciousProsecution, 3o AM. L. REPS. 4 TH 572
(1984).
See supratext accompanying notes 68-6g.
248.
249.
W. VA. CODE § 55-2-12 (2008); Snodgrass v. Sisson's Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 244
S.E.2d 321, 325 (W. Va. 1978) (noting malicious prosecutions have a one-year statute of
limitations).
250.
JOSEPH, supra note 1 19, at 307.
See, e.g., Warnock v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 5 :o8cvo i-DCB-JMR,
251.
2oo8 WL 4594129, at *io (S.D. Miss. Oct. 14, 2oo8) (dismissing abuse of process as time barred,
but allowing RICO claim based on same conduct).
243.
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and convincing evidence standard.25- This higher burden is meant to prevent
the "moral stigma" that accompanies fraud allegations from attaching
erroneously.253 Conversely, RICO plaintiffs need only prove their allegations
by a preponderance of the evidence.254 This is so even for fraud-based

predicate acts, which normally would require a heightened burden of proof
in civil cases.== The result here is counterintuitive. If CSX brought an
identical claim against the Peirce firm, but alleged only one fraudulent
lawsuit, it would have had to prove its claims by clear and convincing evidence.
But when CSX alleged more widespread harm, the burden of proof is
lessened. As one former judge has opined in a different RICO context, this
lower burden of proof "skews the balance developed under state law and gives
RICO plaintiffs a super-plaintiff status."25 6
B.

ELEVATIONOFRULE iz VIOLATIONS TOl DERAL TORT

Even if heightened civil liability for repeated mail and wire fraud is
normatively desirable, the CSXverdict-and by extension the RICO reprisalnonetheless suffers from doctrinal flaws. Allowing representations made in
federal litigation filings to serve as the only predicate acts, and therefore the
sole basis for liability, under civil RICO is directly contrary to unanimous
precedent holding that Rule 11 does not create a private right of action.=57 At
best, the RICO reprisal is ill-advised and contrary to precedent, at worst it
threatens an illegal expansion of Rule I i under the Rules Enabling Act.5 8
To support its claim that the mass complaints filed by the Peirce firm
each constituted mail fraud, CSX had to prove that those complaints
contained fraudulent misrepresentations that CSX justifiably relied on to its
determinant.259 CSX could not accomplish this by pointing to inaccurate

Getzendanner, supra note 136, at 681.
Id.
254.
Id.; MALLEN & RHODES, supra note 64, § 12:69. The Supreme Court expressly declined
to address the burden of proof issue in Sedima. Id. But multiple references in the legislative history
of the RICO Act show that Congress intended to impose this lower standard. See Leigh Ann
MacKenzie, Civil RICO: Prior CriminalConviction and Burden ofProof 6o NOTRE DAME L. REv. 566,
582 (1985) (citing legislative sources).
255.
JOSEPH, supranote 119, at 234.
256.
Getzendanner, supra note 136, at 681.
257.
See 1-2 GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANcTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE
§ 17(A) (8) (5th ed. 2015) (citing cases); see also Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 4 85 , 4 9 2 ( 4 th Cir.
1991), cert. denied sub nom. Schatz v. Weinberg & Green, 503 U.S. 936 (1992) ("Courts have
consistently refused to use ethical codes to define standards of civil liability for lawyers.").
258.
See supra text accompanying note 138.
259.
The RICO reliance issue is in a state of flux in the case law. The Supreme Court has
held that reliance need not be proven as an element of a RICO charge based on mail fraud,
despite the fact that common law fraud includes such an element. Bridge v. Phoenix Bond
Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 653 (2008). Importantly, mail fraud-a criminal statute--does not
require proof of reliance. The crime-use of mails as part of a scheme to defraud-is complete
upon the commission of the act. United States v. Useni, 516 F.3 d 634, 648 (7th Cir. 2008)
252.

&
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allegations in these complaints; no attorney can argue that her client was
harmed by assuming that allegations in a complaint are true because such a
position is contrary to our adversarial system of justice.16 Instead of relying
on the allegations themselves, CSX argued that it relied on the Peirce firm's
"representations" that the "that the claims at issue had a good faith basis in
fact" under Rule i i of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure..61 CSX
argued that because it had relied on these representations of good faith, it
was forced "to expend substantial money and resources to process, defend
.

6
and/or settle the deliberately fabricated claims."

These Rule i i "misrepresentations" were essential to CSX's case because
they provided the element of falsity necessary for CSX to prove a "scheme to
defraud" under the mail-fraud statute.263 Accordingly, what CSX did-and the
trial court allowed-is to create tort liability out of Rule 11.
How serious the repercussions are for this decision-and for decisions
like it-depends in large part on the precise Rule i1-whether state or
federal-at issue. If, as is often the case in aggregate litigation, plaintiffs made
the underlying representations in federal court, the possibility of Rule
1 1-RICO tort liability raises constitutional concerns by implicating the Rules
Enabling Act ("REA").2 64 The REA provides that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure "shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right."265

Relying on the REA, the Supreme Court has consistently interpreted Rule 11
to avoid the exact kind of automatic fee shifting between parties that occurred
(finding that mail fraud required proof only that a defendant participated in a scheme to defraud
and caused the mails to be used in furtherance of that scheme). See also generally 18 U.S.C. § 1341
(2012). Nevertheless, although reliance isn't an element of RICO or mail fraud, the Supreme
Court was careful to point out that reliance might still be necessary proof of causation. As the
Court noted, "[o]f course, a misrepresentation can cause harm only if a recipient of the
misrepresentation relies on it." Bridge, 553 U.S. at 656 n.6. This language has caused significant
confusion in the courts. SeeJOSEPH, supra note 119, at 1 15.
See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Gilkison, 4o6 F. App'x 723, 737 (4 th Cir. 2olo) (Davis, J.,
260.
concurring) ("CSX had the ability, and its lawyers had a duty, to access, examine, and where

appropriate, contest the other side's evidence, including, as here, evidence with respect to the
sufficiency of [plaintiffs] asbestosis claim.. . . One is left to ponder how a party represented by
capable counsel might reasonably rely on the allegations made on behalf of its adversary."

(alterations in original)).
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Peirce, 974 F. Supp. 2d 927, 933, 938 (N.D.W. Va. 2013); see also
261.
Principal/Response Brief for Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 43-44, CSX Transp. Inc., v. Peirce,
Nos. 1 3 -22 3 5 (L), 13-2252, 13-2325 (N.D.W. Va.June 30, 2014). West Virginia's Rule i
the federal version. See W. VA. R. Civ. P. 11.

mirrors

262.

Third Amended Complaint, supranote 168, at ¶1 164-65-

263.

See Principal/Response Brief for Appellee/Cross-Appellant, supra note 261, at 43-44

(asserting that Rule it "defines the nature of the representation that is made when a suit is filed,"
which gave rise to the claims in its case).

264.

28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2o2). For example, although the Garlock claims settled before

ripening, Garlock appeared to base its RICO claims, in part, on certifications made to the
bankruptcy courts, which have their own Rule 11 counterpart: Fed. R. Bank. P. go i. See
Complaint, supra note 20g, at 9.

265.

28 U.S.C. § 2072.
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in CSX. In Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic CommunicationsEnterprises, Inc., for
example, the Supreme Court rejected an REA challenge to an old version of
Rule 11 that required sanctions if a party did not conduct a reasonable inquiry
before filing a pleading or paper.26 6 In rejecting the argument that this
provision created a federal tort for malicious prosecution, and thus violated
the REA, the Supreme Court explained that "[t]he main objective of the Rule
is not to reward parties who are victimized by litigation; it is to deter baseless
filings and curb abuses." 67 Any effect on substantive rights-that is, the fact
that the opposing party might benefit from sanctions-was merely
"incidental."2 68 The Court even expressed "confiden[ce] that district courts
will resist the temptation to use sanctions as substitutes for tort damages." 69
In light of this precedent, it is difficult to understand how any court is able to
allow RICO liability based on predicate conduct that is premised entirely on
misrepresentations in litigation filings.
Although CSXwas not a federal Rule 11 case-and thus didn't raise these
same constitutional REA concerns-the court still should have heeded the
Supreme Court's warning. Regulatory tools like West Virginia's Rule i i target
parties already before the court, and are specifically aimed at the conduct at
issue here: to "discourage groundless proceedings."27o These sanctions are

meant to be the first line of defense, "to compensate wronged parties by
means of affirmative relief."'7, They incorporate principles of equity, and
ensure that access to courts is one factor balanced against imposing
sanctions.272 However, it is also universally understood that that these

sanctions may not be enough-that tort actions are also needed to further
compensate wronged parties and deter wrongful conduct. Critically, courts
have consistently held that state torts must fulfill this need in the maliciousprosecution context.273

266.
267.
268.
269.

Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc'ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 551 (1991).
Id. at 553.
Id.
Id.
270.
Port Drum Co. v. Umphrey, 852 F.2d 148, 150 (5 th Cir. 1988). West Virginia's Rules of Civil
Procedure are "practically identical to the Federal Rules," and West Virginia courts "give substantial
weight" to federal cases in interpreting them. Painter v. Peavy, 451 S.E.2d 755, 758 n.6 (W. Va- 1994).
271.
Port Drum Co., 8 5 2 F.2d at 150.
272.
Warner v. Wingfield, 685 S.E.2d 250, 255 (W. Va. 2oo9) (identifying the purpose of W.
VA. RULE 11 in discouraging "unfounded claims or defenses asserted for vexatious, wanton, or
oppressive purposes" while still maintaining "unrestricted access to the judicial system").
273.
See, e.g., United States Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3 d 383, 393 ( 3 d Cir. 2002)
(holding that, just as Rule 11 doesn't create a cause of action, so too Rule 11 doesn't prevent litigants
in federal courts from bringing state malicious prosecution); Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 922
F.2d 6o, 70 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "do not provide an
independent ground for subject matterjurisdiction over an action for which there is no other basis for
jurisdiction"); see also FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee's notes to 1993 amendment (noting "that
Rule i1 does not preclude a party from initiating an independent action for malicious prosecution or
abuse of process"); Brief of Amicus Curiae American Ass'n for Justice in Support of Defendants-
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Contrary to this weight of authority, the court in CSX essentially created
federal tort liability out of a lawyer's Rule 11 duty to file complaints and other
litigation documents with a good-faith basis for doing so. In addition to the
troubling rejection of authority and potential constitutional and legal
concerns this raises, allowing litigation representations to suffice as RICO
predicate acts would also lead to absurd results. One court warned of this
problem in Curtis & Associates, P.C. v. Law Offices ofDavid M. Bushman, Esq.,274
a leading case rejecting the use of civil RICO under circumstances similar to
CSX In that case, the RICO plaintiff, the Curtis firm, alleged that the attorney
defendants participated in a scheme to defraud Curtis by filing baseless
malpractice suits against Curtis on behalf of former Curtis clients.275 As in
CSX, the predicate acts were all the mailing of pleadings and other
correspondence related to malpractice cases. The Curtiscourt cautioned that,
if litigation activities such as filing a complaint or serving documents could be
violations of RICO, "then almost every state or federal action could lead to
corollary federal RICO actions."27 6 Were the court to permit RICO claims
based on litigation activity, it explained, "defendants could conceivably
countersue plaintiffs for RICO conspiracy violations based upon the many
allegations and statements by plaintiffs in this action which defendants might
similarly contend are frivolous or false."277

Judge Kiyo A. Matsumoto's prediction in Curtis has come to fruition.
Earlier this year, one of the defendants in the Garlock case-Simon
Greenstone-filed a counterclaim against Garlock, alleging claims for RICO,
abuse of process, and fraudulent inducement.27 8 The essential allegations are
that Garlock filed its civil RICO action against Simon Greenstone to threaten
Simon Greenstone in order to gain leverage against it in the corresponding
bankruptcy proceeding.79 The aggregate-litigation landscape may stand at
the edge of the "endless cycle" of civil RICO actions that Judge Matsumoto
warned about. This kind of pleading practice has negative implications for the
efficiency and legitimacy of the court system.

.

.

Appellants & Reversal, supranote 141, at 25 ("W. Va. R. Civ. P. 11 carries its own set of sanctions to be
administered by West Virginia judges who, as this Court has pointedly observed 'are perfectly capable
of handling [any] malfeasance in their own courts.'" (alteration in original) (quoting Balt. Scrap Corp.
v. DavidJ.Joseph CO., 237 F.3 d 394, 403 (4 th Cir. 2001))).
Curtis & Assocs., P.C. v. Law Offices of David M. Bushman, Esq., 758 F. Supp. 2d 153,
274.
172-73 (E.D.N.Y. 201o), affd sub nom. Curtis v. Law Offices of David M. Bushman, Esq., 443 F.
App'x 582 (2d Cir. 2011).
275.
Id. at 17 4 -7 5
276.
Id. at 173
277.
Id.
See generally Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaims, supranote 218.
278.
279.
See id. at 1 107.
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1 DERALUZATION OF STATE COMMON-LAWMALCIO US-PROSECUTION
ACTIONS

The use of civil RICO as a malicious prosecution action also results in a
usurpation of the state forum. This "federalization of state tort law" is
particularly troubling when there are clear state-law remedies available and
tailored to address the conduct at issue, where expansion of RICO would
result in the usurpation of state law, and where they encourage improper
forum shopping.
First, at the present time, the state forum is the natural place for
prosecution of these types of torts. In CSX the particular allegations of
misconduct-that is, filing claims without probable cause and filing litigation
documents to support those claims-mirror the claims that most naturally
give rise to malicious prosecution and abuse of process, which are both state
claims. As noted above, allowing litigants to bring these claims as federal civil
RICO actions allows litigants to bypass more stringent state pleading
requirements, provides higher damage awards, and allows for a lower burden
of proof-all ignoring the need for a balance between access to courts and
prevention of frivolous litigation.-8 o The state has been the historical forum
for hashing out this balance as its courts and lawmakers have designed and
refined its frivolous litigation torts and sanctions to balance issues of access to
justice, efficiency, and reduction of waste in the judicial system. Of course,
lawmakers and courts have also engaged in this kind of thoughtful policy
discussion regarding frivolous litigation remedies at the federal level: the
result is the Rule 1 1 sanction. But they certainly have not done so in the
context of civil RICO.
Civil RICO is particularly susceptible to over-extension and usurpation of
state law-a point that Chief Justice Rehnquist has recognized. 8 1 He
compared civil and criminal RICO actions to illustrate the point.=8- Criminal
RICO is "kept under control," he said, "by the use of prosecutorial discretion
by United States attorneys" who "concentrate on the fraudulent schemes
which are either too big or too widespread for efficient state prosecution."2 8 3
Not so for civil RICO, ChiefJustice Rehnquist lamented, where there is "no
such thing as prosecutorial discretion to limit [its] use .... Any good lawyer
who can bring himself within the terms of the federal civil RICO provisions
will sue in federal court because of the prospect of treble damages and
attorney's fees which civil RICO holds out."284
280.

See discussion infta Part VA.

281.

Rehnquist, supra note 134, at o.

Id.
Id.
283.
284.
Id.; see also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 529-30 (1985) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]hese suits are being brought-in the unfettered discretion of private litigantsin federal court against legitimate businesses seeking treble damages in ordinary fraud and
282.

contract cases.").
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Of course, litigants like Garlock and CSX argue that the cases at issue,
involving an "extensive and broader scheme to defraud,"2 5 are exactly the
types that should be prosecuted in federal court under RICO. There is some
support for this argument, especially considering the Supreme Court's
unquestioning endorsement of RICO's liberal-construction provision.
Further support for this view is found in the consensus noted in Part IV.B that
existing remedies for frivolous litigation-including malicious prosecution
and Rule 11 sanctions-have proven inadequate to the task. But expanding
civil RICO is not the answer.
The weight of the evidence suggests that Congress did not intend to
usurp state-law malicious-prosecution actions when it enacted civil RICO. One
court, in holding that "litigation activities" cannot serve as a predicate acts to
civil RICO, explained that "there can be no dispute that 'Congress did not
intend to effect a wholesale preemption of state civil law in its enactment of
RICO.'"S 6 Courts have consistently agreed with this position, refusing to
permit pure litigation activities to serve as RICO predicate acts, in part
because doing so would permit the federalization of state common law.2 8 7In

expanding RICO to cover conduct that is clearly covered by other statutes,
including malicious prosecution and abuse of process, cases like CSX and
Garlock do just that.
Critics might further argue that cases like CSX and Garlock involve some
kind of aggravated malicious prosecution that warrant harsher remedies. But,
even if that is so, there is still a danger that federalization of such an
"aggravated malicious prosecution" action will result in improper forum
shopping. Any plaintiffs considering an action against a former opposing
party for malicious prosecution will be drawn to the federal forum by the
easier burdens of proof, lesser pleading requirements, and higher damages
noted above. They will also be drawn by the ability to sidestep state-level
procedural tools specially designed to protect litigants and the right to
petition.
Anti-Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation ("anti-SLAPP")
statutes-are a key example of this. Multiple states have implemented antiSLAPP statutes to protect individuals from retaliatory lawsuits designed to
stifle First Amendment activity.288 Although these procedural tools differ in
Page-Proof Principal/Response Brief for Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 57 n.8, CSX
285.
Transp., Inc. v. Peirce, No. 5 :0 5 -cv-00202-FPS-JES ( 4 th Cir. Apr. 28, 2014).
286.
Curtis & Assocs., P.C. v. Law Offices of David M. Bushman, Esq., 758 F. Supp. 2d 153, 174
(E.D.N.Y. 2olo) (quoting von Bulowv. von Bulow, 657 F. Supp. 1134, 1143 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)), affd sub
nom. Curtis v, Law Offices of David M. Bushman, Esq., 443 F. App'x 582 (2d Cir. 2o1i).
287.
See id. at 174-75 (collecting cases); see also United States v. Eisen, 974 F.2d 246, 254
(2d Cir. 1992) (noting the "understandable reluctance" on the part of Congress "to use federal
criminal law as a back-stop for all state court litigation").
For an early authority on the development of SLAPPs, see generally GEORGE W. PRING
288.
& PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPs: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT (1996). There are obvious First
Amendment issues raised by lawsuits predicated on a person's decision to file a lawsuit. See, e.g.,
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each jurisdiction, in the main they create any early-stage procedural
mechanism by which a defendant in a SLAPP litigation can, upon a showing
that the basis of the plaintiffs lawsuit is protected activity, shift the burden to
the plaintiff to establish probable cause for the cause of action.289 The purpose
of these statutes is to "protect those engaging in First Amendment activity and
deter abusive lawsuits by providing for early termination of the suit and award
of the target defendant's fees incurred in achieving early dismissal of the
SLAPP."so

The defendants in CSXand Garlockargue that those cases are thinly veiled
attempts by the defense bar to further weaken class actions by targeting the
plaintiffs' attorneys themselves. Accepting for the moment that is the case,
then anti-SLAPP motions would be the exact means for uncovering such a
scheme. Simon Greenstone, one of the defendant law firms in Garlock, has
filed a SLAPP motion arguing that because the litigation is targeting First
Amendment activity, Garlock should be required to establish by a "reasonable
probability" and with "clear and specific evidence" that it will prevail.2s9 But
there is no federal anti-SLAPP statute,29 and state anti-SLAPP statutes have
not been applied in cases in federal court based on federal-question
jurisdiction.s93 Furthermore, some states-including West Virginia, where
CSX filed its civil RICO action-do not have anti-SLAPP procedures.294
2

Prof'1 Real Estate Inv'rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 69 (1993) (Stevens,

J., concurring in the judgment) ("Access to the courts is far too precious a right for us to infer
wrongdoing from nothing more than using the judicial process to seek a competitive advantage
in a doubtful case."). However the First Amendment implications of the RICO reprisal-while of
fundamental importance-are beyond the scope of this Article.
289.
PRING & CANAN, supra note 288, at 188-205.
290.
StevenJ. Andr6, Anti-SLAPP Confabulationand the Government Speech Doctrine, 44 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 117, 119-20 (2014) (citation omitted).
291.
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike &, Alternatively, to Dismiss
Pursuant to Rule FRCP 12(6) at 23, Garlock Sealing Techs. LLC. v. Simon Greenstone Panatier
Bartlett, P.C., No. 3:14-cv-oo1 16 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 3, 2014).
292.
A bipartisan group of representatives recently endorsed the SPEAK FREE Act of 2015,
H.R. 2304, 11 4 th Cong. (2016), which would, among other things, create a special motion to
dismiss early in a case targeting First Amendment activity. For arguments supporting a federal
anti-SLAPP law, see generally Jerome I. Braun, California'sAnti-SLAPP Remedy After Eleven Years,
34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 731 (2003); MarcJ. Randazza, The Need for a Unified and Cohesive National
Anti-SLAPPLaw, 91 OR. L. REV. 627 (2012); Carson Hilary Barylak, Note, Reducing Uncertainty in
Anti-SLAPP Protection, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 845, 849 (2010).
293.

19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 4509 (2d ed. 1996); Robert T. Sherwin, Clones, Thugs, 'N (Eventual?)Harmony: Using the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to Simulate a StatutoryDefamationDefense and Make the World Safefrom Copyright
Bullies, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 823, 852 n.237 (2015). There is also considerable disagreement in
the courts on whether state anti-SLAPP provisions should apply in cases that involve some type of
state law claim. See generally Benjamin Ernst, Note, Fighting SLAPPs in Federal Cour: Erie, The Rules
EnablingAct, and The Application of State Anti-SLAPP Laws in FederalDiversity Actions, 56 B.C. L. REV.
1181 (2015); Tyler J. Kimberly, Note, A SLAPP Back on Track: How Shady Grove Prevents the
Application of Anti-SLAPP Laws in Federal Courts, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1201 (2015).
294.
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As a result, defendants wishing to file retaliatory litigation need only
choose to bring a federal RICO action instead of a state malicious-prosecution
action to protect themselves from early termination via anti-SLAPP. Even if
such a retaliatory lawsuit did not ultimately succeed, the mere ability to bring
and sustain a RICO lawsuit for any period of time raises a significant threat to
plaintiffs' attorneys. The result of this is a greater danger that defendants will
use civil RICO and the federal forum not to remedy legitimate wrongs, but to
stifle the use of aggregate litigation.
D.

PUNISHMENT OF THE AGGREGATE LITIGATION TOOL SPECIFICALLY

Finally, the RICO reprisal punishes not only fraudulent conduct, but the
aggregate-litigation device itself. CSX accused the Peirce firm of more than
just filing individual baseless asbestosis claims; it claimed that the defendants
filed "mass lawsuits ... as part of a grander plan to conceal the fraudulent
claims."2s5 Endorsing this approach, the CSXcourt allowed CSX to attempt to
recover at trial the cost of defending not just the i i allegedly fraudulent
claims, but the cost of defending the full mass actions. As shown, Garlock has
included similar allegations of liability across multiple claims," suggesting that
there, too, liability will not be limited to the specific baseless claims.
This practice conflicts with the Supreme Court's holding in Sedima that
the alleged injury (and thus the potential basis for damages) must be
proximately caused by the predicate acts.29 6 It is telling that this is the only
time the Supreme Court has authorized a limitation on the interpretation of
RICO, and this holding has led lower courts to recognize the Court's
proximate-cause requirement as a deliberate policy choice to "limit ... the
collection of private RICO damages."297 This limitation has successfully served
to bar RICO causes of action unless there is some direct tie between the
predicate acts and the alleged harm.298

states-free-speech-protection (last visited Sept. 14, 2016) (collecting the pertinent statutes and
judicial decisions establishing some type of anti-SLAPP procedure).
295.
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Gilkison, No. 5 :05 CV202, 2012 WL 1598081, at *13 (N.D.W. Va.
May 3, 2012).
296.
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 497 (1985) ("Any recoverable
damages occurring by reason of a violation of § i962(C) will flow from the commission of the
predicate acts." (citation omitted)).
297.
Cullom v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 859 F.2d 1211, 1215 (5 th Cir. 1988).
298.
CompareMcDonaldv. Schencker, 18 F. 3 d 4 9 1, 4 9 5 ( 7 th Cir. 1994) (rejecting plaintiffs
attempt to turn the common law doctrine of conversion into a RICO claim by "simply throwing
in several mailings" based in part on the lack of proof that the mailings themselves caused the
harm), withAppley v. West, 832 F.2d 1021, 1028 ( 7 th Cir. 1987) (finding a scheme to defraud
for purposes of the mail fraud statute where each mailing served to conceal the conversion of
funds). See also generally Howard Adler, Jr. &John A. Francis, Proximate Cause: A GrowingLimitation
on Civil RICO Actions, 13 RICO L. REP. 1443 (1991) (collecting and analyzing cases where the
courts upheld the dismissal of civil RICO complaints for failing to prove proximate cause based
on mail fraud predicate acts).
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There is no such direct tie in CSX between the predicate acts and the
alleged harm. The predicate acts alleged in included: (1) the filing of the 1i1
fraudulent claims; (2) letters to the court regarding scheduling, mediation,
and other matters related to those 11 claims; and (3) communications with
opposing counsel about those claims.299 Importantly, CSX never alleged, nor
argued, that any of the thousands of other claims were fraudulent. In fact, at
oral argument on a motion to compel, CSX admitted the i1 claims were "the
only claims from which we can attempt to prove fraud and from which we can
attempt to prove damages."soo Despite this, the court refused to limit CSX's
damage claims and evidence at trial to alleged damages specifically related to
the 11 claims at issue, instead accepting CSX's argument that the predicate
acts of racketeering were not the 11 fraudulent individual cases, but "the mass
suits themselves."so As amicus noted, "[w]hat turned the 11 isolated false
claims into a pattern, CSXT [successfully] alleged, was the filing of a large
number of entirely legitimate cases as part of a system of fraud."02
The RICO reprisal allows any defendant in aggregate litigation who
discovers more than one known unjustified claim to allege a "scheme to
defraud" and, thereby, to use the federal forum to penalize plaintiffs'
attorneys for the entire action. If, on the other hand, the Peirce firm had
represented only one plaintiff in a baseless asbestosis case against CSX, it is
highly unlikely that a RICO claim would succeed. The low number of illegal
acts, the limited time in which those acts took place, or the small number of
participants in the "enterprise" would likely foreclose such a claim. Instead,
CSX would have to use one of the traditional methods for combatting
frivolous lawsuits, such as a malicious-prosecution action. However, because
these are cases filed by one set of attorneys on behalf of thousands of plaintiffs,
the court allowed a RICO claim to proceed, meaning the plaintiffs' attorneys
are faced with treble damages, attorneys' fees, and costs, and the social stigma
of being labeled "racketeers."
Not only does this inflate the claim against the plaintiffs' attorneys due
to their use of an aggregate-litigation device, it also implies that the litigation
form itself (i.e. a mass action) is harmful. This is particularly troubling
because it imposes penalties on conduct simply because that conduct occurs
in aggregate litigation. The result chills aggregate-litigation activities and
access to courts. As the Curtis court observed, "[i]f any litigant's or attorney's

299.

Va. May

See generally CSX Transp., Inc. v. Gilkison, No.

5

:0 5 CV202, 2012

WL 1598081 (N.D.W.

3, 2012).

Motion in Limine No. i by Defendants Robert N. Peirce, Jr. & Louis A. Raimond
300.
Seeking to Preclude CSX from Presenting Evidence or Argument that Any Claims, Other Than
the Eleven Claims at Issue, Were Allegedly Fraudulent at i, CSX Transp. Inc. v. Peirce, No. 5:05CV-202 (N.D.W. Va. Nov. 13, 2012) (quoting an admission made by CSX's counsel in court).
301.

CSX Transp., InC., 2012 WL 15 98081, at *13.

Brief of Amicus Curiae American Ass'n forJustice in Support of Defendants-Appellants
& Reversal, supra note 141, at 8.
302.
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pleading and correspondence in an unsuccessful lawsuit could lead to drastic
RICO liability in a private right of action, litigants might hesitate to avail
themselves of the courts and available legal remedies or be unable to find
representation to help vindicate their rights."303 This is especially so in our
adversarial system of justice, where attorneys have a duty to represent their
clients zealously. One author articulated the result of this conflict aptly:
[T]he adversary system is impeded when an attorney must worry
about whether or not 'fighting too hard' will invoke the wrath of
opposing counsel and the opposing party. When an attorney's ability
to go all out for his or her client is tempered by concern for eventual
liability to that adversary, the adversary process isjeopardized.so4
If class actions, mass actions, and other aggregate litigation are valuable
procedural tools, then methods to prevent these tools from being used should
be strongly questioned.
One counterargument is that the RICO reprisal is an effective regulatory
measure, given the flaws of aggregate litigation. There is some support for this
position, especially considering that CSX cannot be entirely to blame for
failing to prove more than the i i baseless claims out of the Peirce firm's
thousands of asbestosis claims. As discussed above,o5 mass actions are
criticized for their ability to "hide" weak claims within the greater mass of
stronger claims. The above analysis also recounts the particular weaknesses
identified in asbestos litigation, specifically the use of questionable mass
screening procedures to identify potential injuries.soO If true, defendants have
a legitimate concern that these aspects of aggregate litigation risk unfairly
shifting the burden to defendants to disprove plaintiffs' claims-sometimes
thousands of them.
Even if aggregate-litigation devices should be reformed, the RICO
reprisal is not the correct remedy because it is both over- and under-inclusive.
The RICO reprisal is over-inclusive in that the onerous penalties of the RICO
statute, coupled with the uncertainty necessarily involved in aggregate
litigation, threaten to "chill litigants and lawyers and frustrate the wellestablished public policy goal of maintaining open access to the courts."307 As
noted above, the civil RICO action targets the whole litigation, not just the
few bad cases, by allowing defendants in aggregate cases to recover the entire
cost of the aggregate litigation. In this way, it threatens the use of the
aggregate-litigation device by placing such a high risk on its use. The device-

303.
Curtis & Assocs., P.C. v. Law Offices of David M. Bushman, Esq., 758 F. Supp. 2d 153,
173 (E.D.N.Y. 2olo), affd sub nom. Curtis v. Law Offices of David M. Bushman, Esq., 4 43 F. App'x
582 (2d Cir. 2011).
Fiebach, supra note 227, at 1302.
304.
See supra Part W.A.
305.
See supra Part IV.B.
306.
307.

Curtis &Assocs., 758 F. Supp. 2d at 173.
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and, indeed, much of the American system of justice-depends on the
initiative of attorneys to take on aggregate litigation at a risk to their own
private interests.
At the same time, the RICO reprisal is under-inclusive because it provides
a remedy for only a small part of what is a much larger, structural problem.
Using RICO reprisals to deter frivolous aggregate litigation essentially asks
defendants in individual aggregate cases to act as private attorneys general,
regulating the conduct of their adversaries. This is a dizzying prospect, and
one rife with potential problems, including the obvious conflict issues that
arise when adversaries are tasked with regulating their opponents'
professional conduct. Further, it is not at all clear that the RICO reprisal
would have the effect of deterring frivolous filings in aggregate litigation
instead of deterring the device altogether-that would need further study.
Even if RICO reprisals could, conceivably, motivate plaintiffs' attorneys
to ensure that more of the cases they file have evidentiary support, RICO
reprisal comes nowhere close to providing the procedure, the structure, or
the resources for doing that. While many scholars have identified flaws in
aggregate litigation devices,sos some have also proposed reforms of those
devices.3s9 Some of these proposed procedures would allow limited feeshifting in specific contexts, such as when plaintiffs fail to get past a motion to
dismiss.310 Many have offered structural "tweaks" on the class-action or massaction devices themselves, including, for example, greater use of partial
certification of class actions which could slow the class action process and put
less pressure on defendants to settle.s3 Courts have also embraced the call for
reform, and often implement creative case-management techniques to
manage-and presumably scrutinize-aggregate litigation.3'z Examples
include the issuance of Lone Pine orders, which are orders requiring that
individual plaintiffs submit prima facie evidence to support their claims for
relief before additional, burdensome discovery occurs.3's Other courts have
practiced phased or sequenced discovery, where courts target initial discovery
at information that "might facilitate settlement negotiations or provide the
foundation for a dispositive motion."s'4
See supra Part IV.A
For a thorough discussion of procedural innovations designed to correct perceived
problems in aggregate litigation see generally COFFEE, supranote 2 (collecting sources, discussing
proposals, and providing critiques).
Id. at 165-68.
310.
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Class Actions and Limited Vision: Opportunitiesfor Improvement Through
311.
a More FunctionalApproach to Class Treatment ofDisputes, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1127, 1128-30 (2005);
see also COFFEE, supra note 2, at 162-65.
312.
See HERR, supra note 2, § 11.421-24.
See generally David B. Weinstein & Christopher Torres, Managing the Complex: A Brief
313.
Survey of Lone Pine Orders, 34 No. 3. WESTLAWJ. ENvr'L. 1 (2013) (collecting cases showing
extensive use of Lone Pine order).
308.
3og.

314.

HERR, supra note 2,

§
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Many of these techniques have been applied to reform the asbestosis
litigation. A trial-level example can be found in Garlock, where the bankruptcy
court used a form of targeted discovery by allowing full discovery into 15
claims that the parties previously settled, which Garlock argued represented
the plaintiffs' attorneys' larger practice of filing baseless claims.3's As a result,

the court lowered the company's overall outstanding liability to potential
asbestos claimants. More systemic reforms have been proposed as well-the
United States Congress is considering an asbestos-bankruptcy-trust-reform bill
that would require greater transparency for asbestosis claims made against
bankruptcy trusts.3, 6 This bill is expressly aimed at avoiding the potential
double-claiming that allegedly occurred in the Garlock case.317
Although myriad commentators and courts recognize the need for
reform, they also recognize and grapple with the structural nature of the
problem. Although over-aggregation is indeed a problem requiring a remedy,
the role of the private attorney general must also be preserved. As John C.
Coffee has warned, "[a]ny remedy has to be a balanced one-or otherwise
plaintiffs attorneys could be constantly threatened with punitive fee shifting
that will deter them from bringing meritorious cases."3' 8 Coffee further
counseled that "Draconian response []" to the problems in aggregate
litigation "could render the private attorney general extinct."319 In the context
of asbestos litigation, for example, any attempt to rein in the practice of hiring
favorable experts must also take into account the significant burdens private
attorneys face in identifying the thousands of victims of asbestosis. Despite the
public nature of the asbestos harm-called the "worst occupational health
disaster in U.S. history"-the public doesn't share the cost of this screening:
plaintiffs' attorneys must, at least until the costs can be shifted to defendants
through settlements or verdicts or until we find a different structural solution.
Consideration of this conflict is entirely missing from the RICO reprisal.
The use of civil RICO in cases like CSXis precisely the kind of "draconian"
response Professor Coffee warns against. Not only does it effectively create a
pure, loser-pays rule for frivolous litigation, it allows defendants in aggregate
litigation to be reimbursed for the costs of defending legitimate litigation.
Further, the remedy goes beyond "fee-shifting," and imposes punitive
measures. CSX sought and received not only the costs to defend the entire
underlying aggregate litigation (even those that CSX lost), but the costs to
bring the RICO action itself.

315.
In re Garlock Sealing Techs., LLC., 50 4 B.R. 71, 84 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2014).
Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act of
316.
2016, H.R. 1927, 11 4 th Cong. (2016).
317.

Legislative Digest: H.R 1927: Fairnessin Class Action Litigationand FurtheringAsbestos Claim

TransparencyAct of 2o6 (sic), Republican Pol'y Committee (Jan 8, 2016), https://policy.house.
gov/legislative-digest/fridayjanuary-8-2016; see also discussion supraPart IV.B.
318.
319.

COFFEE,

Id.
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at 165.
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PROPOSALS

Based on the observations above, I offer several suggestions for
responding to the RICO reprisal. Each of these proposals is aimed at
reforming the RICO statute or common law to ensure that RICO litigation
adequately conforms to the law and protects the right to petition in aggregate
litigation.
At a minimum, courts must limit the damages available in RICO claims
against attorneys for litigation conduct to the injury proximately caused by
the actually frivolous litigation, i.e. the predicate acts only.320 A plaintiff like
CSX is not entitled to damages for the costs to defend against the aggregate
litigation when it only proves a small portion of that litigation is baseless. CSX
should only have been able to claim damages for the ii proven baseless
claims: the predicate acts of mail fraud alleged in its lawsuit. Such an
interpretation of RICO is consistent with Supreme Court precedent.21, It
would also minimize the "draconian" nature of the RICO reprisal by making
it less likely that cases like CSXand Garlock might cause plaintiffs' attorneys to
forego representing legitimate plaintiffs due to the economic risks that this
unwarranted fee-shifting raises.
But courts should go further than this and protect the right to petition
in aggregate litigation by requiring a showing of malicious intent for RICO
reprisal actions against attorneys targeting pure litigation conduct.
This showing of intent is the means by which the application of the RICO
doctrine to attorneys' aggregate litigation conduct may be harmonized with
the existing state abusive litigation torts and corresponding litigation privilege
doctrine322 As explained, in most jurisdictions under the common law,
lawyers are absolutely immune from liability for conduct or communications
that might offend opposing parties323 Many jurisdictions have carved an
exception to this immunity to allow for malicious prosecution and abuse of
process litigation. But that exception is a narrow one, requiring proof of
malice, which is traditionally articulated as either use of the proceeding for
an ulterior motive or with "knowledge that there is no probable cause for the
proceeding."324
See Evans v. City of Chicago, 434 F. 3 d g16, 919 ( 7 th Cir. 2oo6) (affirming the lower
320.
court's grant of a motion to dismiss RICO claim for attorneys' fees to defend wrongfully filed
criminal charges when defendant had paid an attorney to defend him on several charges). The
court determined that it would be hard to tell which portion of the fees were attributable to the
wrongfully filed charges. Id. at 933.
See supra PartIII.
321.
Although no federal court has applied the litigation privilege to a federal statutory
322.
claim the legal and policy reasons for doing so abound. SeerAnenson, supranote loi, at 928-29.
Anenson also argues how the same rationale that supports the application of the immunity in
state courts, including the ability to represent clients without fear of being sued, counsels in favor
of application of litigation privilege to statutory claims. See id. at 929 & n.79.
323.

See supra Part IV.B.

324.

MALLEN & RHODES, supra note 64,

§ 6:42;

see also supraPart I.B.
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The historical origins of the litigation privilege additionally reveal that
application of this privilege and its limited exceptions to the CSXcase and the
RICO reprisal makes particular sense. The doctrine has its roots in England,
evolving to protect lawyers from libel claims based on statements made during
trials.325 The intent is to protect speech, as "a contrary rule .. . would unduly
stifle attorneys from zealously advancing the interests of their clients . . . ."32 6
Under my proposal, the mere act of filing complaints in court-even
frivolous complaints-would no longer justify RICO liability for aggregate
litigation attorneys. Instead, some broader scheme, linked with (or
evidencing) an intent to harm must be shown.
Applying the litigation privilege to statutory RICO claims serves two
purposes. It ensures application of the protections historically provided at
common law. It also serves as added protection for the plaintiff attorney in
aggregate litigation attorney who serves as private attorney general, making
multiple filings on behalf of the public and taking upon herself the risks
associated with such filings. This is not to say that we should necessarily
impose a lesser professional standard on such attorneys; however, application
of the existing common law immunity and malicious prosecution standards
to aggregate litigation attorneys in the civil RICO context simply recognizes
the everyday reality of aggregate litigation, and situates that reality within the
existing tort and ethical standards.
Another benefit of this proposal is that it begins to draw a line for
determining an acceptable level of liability for frivolous litigation in aggregate
litigation. The goal of the civil justice system is not, and cannot be, to have a
system absolutely free of frivolous lawsuits. Even the CSX standard-1 i
baseless lawsuits out of 53oo-is an unrealistic line considering the modern
realities of aggregate litigation practice. Perhaps more importantly, drawing
such arbitrary lines would weed out an unacceptable number of meritorious
lawsuits in the process.
The question is how many meritorious lawsuits we are willing to deter in
order to free the system of frivolous lawsuits. A good starting point for
answering this question is to decide that litigation activities, by themselves,
cannot constitute predicate acts under civil RICO. By drawing this line,
defendants would not be prevented from seeking remedies for wrongs done
in litigation, but they would be required to use the techniques already
available for doing so, including sanctions and malicious prosecution.
There are three ways to implement the litigation privilege proposal-one
judicial and two legislative. Thejudicial solution is to adopt existing precedent
that refuses to extend civil RICO to litigation activities absent systemic or
external wrongdoing.327

325.

326.
327.

SeeAnenson, supra note los, at 919-20 (discussing origins of immunity doctrine).
Id. at 920 (quoting Surace v. Wuliger, 495 N.E.2d 939, 944 (Ohio 1986)).
Curtis & Assocs., P.C. v. Law Offices of David M. Bushman, Esq., 758 F. Supp. 2d 153,
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The practical benefit of this proposal is that it does not require statutory
amendment. Instead, when a civil RICO case involves allegations of
wrongdoing in litigation, courts should simply follow the lead of cases like
Curtis, and limit attorneys' liability to cases involving systemic wrongdoing or
wrongdoing "external to, and independent of" the underlying litigation
disputes.32 8 This would ensure that only the truly widespread cases of fraud
would be brought to the federal forum and subject to harsher penalties, and
it would bring RICO application in line with what at least one author has
argued was Congress's original intent: that the statute be "used to combat
sophisticated business frauds."329 In addition, because tort liability would be
based on more than mere "litigation activities," there would be no further
danger of the RICO reprisal unlawfully extending Rule 11 under the REA.sso
The judicial solution also accounts for the access to justice, efficiency, and
reduction of waste concerns in the aggregate litigation context by ensuring
that the proof of malicious intent is more closely aligned with the resulting
liability. By requiring that systemic and/or external fraud be proven in
addition to the underlying alleged abusive litigation activities, civil RICO's
liability-which comes with treble damages, costs and attorneys' fees-may
begin to be proportionate.
There are two possible legislative solutions to ensuring that civil RICO
cases no longer target attorneys' pure litigation activities: one is to remove
mail and wire fraud as predicate acts, and the other is to require that RICO
plaintiffs allege some predicate act in addition to mail or wire fraud. These
proposals are not new: authors like Judge Susan Getzendanner have offered
them in other contexts,3s 1 and they make eminent sense here. Specifically, if
litigants were required to allege some predicate act other than mail fraud in
cases like CSX a clear line would be drawn between cases that involve only
litigation activities-such as mailing documents as part of the litigation-and
those that involve "something more."3s3 Under these proposals, a case like
Chevron, which involves allegations of extortion and bribery in addition to the

174-76 (E.D.N.Y. 201o), aff'd sub nom. Curtis v. Law Offices of David M. Bushman, Esq., 443 F.
App'x 582 (2d Cir. 2o 1) (collecting cases).
See id.
328.
Pierson, supra note 129, at 221 (citing committee reports and hearing transcripts).
329.
330.

See supra Part V.B.

Getzendanner, supra note 136, at 685-89 & n-56; see also Rehnquist, supra note 134, at 11
331.
(calling into question the idea of RICO's creation of a civil counterpart to mail and wire fraud).
For an example of a malicious prosecution-type case that would be still be viable under this
332.
proposal, see Feld EntertainmentInc. v. American Societyfor thePrevention of Cruelty to Animals, 873 F. Supp.
2d 288, 311-12, 332 (D.D.C. 2012) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss RICO claims alleging
predicate acts of bribery, illegal witness payments, wire fraud and money laundering, obstruction of
justice, and wire and mail fraud based on allegations that animal rights activists conducted "multiple
schemes" in part by filing knowingly false litigation in order "to permanently ban Asian elephants in
circuses, to defraud [the plaintiffJ of money and property, and to unjustly enrich themselves").
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mailing of litigation documents, would be able to proceed under civil RICO,
while CSX, which involved only allegations of mail fraud, would not.
These legislative solutions have some of the same benefits of the judicial
proposal above: namely, they solve the REA problem, they have the same
clarity and efficiency benefits, they would also ensure that only wrongdoing
external to, and independent of the underlying disputes would be penalized,
and only the truly systemic cases of fraud would be both brought to the federal
forum and subject to harsher penalties.
Removing mail-fraud as a stand-alone predicate act has an added benefit
of ensuring that potential RICO plaintiffs like CSX are unable to easily evade
the intent requirement of the malicious prosecution exception to the
litigation privilege. As noted above, mail fraud requires proof of a mailing
coupled with a scheme to defraud.333 Although mail fraud does require proof
of intent to harm, it only requires such an intent as to the greater "scheme to
defraud," not as to each mailing.334 Accordingly, RICO plaintiffs may allege

that hundreds of litigation documents are included as predicate acts, merely
because they relate to the scheme to inflate the value of the litigation. That is
exactly what happened in CSX-CSX pled as predicate acts every document
that even mentioned one of the 11 underlying meritless cases, including the
entire mass complaints themselves.
Some might argue that there is, in fact, a clear tie between the broader
scheme to defraud in cases like CSX and Garlock and the wider liability to
which the RICO defendants are exposed. Both involve plaintiffs' attorneys
practicing in the asbestos bar, a litigation field that has been subject to a
significant amount of criticism. And Judge Jack's scathing opinion regarding
Dr. Harron in the federal MDL gives us strong reason to suspect that Dr.
Harron's misconduct in CSXaffected more than the 11. cases that CSX proved
were part of the scheme to defraud at trial.
If that is the case, then it may be that RICO application to the Peirce firm
would be appropriate in CSX However, proof of wider fraud is a fact only a
jury could decide, and there was no such proof at trial. In fact, CSX admitted
it could only prove that the i i specific cases were fraudulent. Without proof
of more, we are left with what we know: that CSX recovered the entire cost of
the underlying aggregate litigation-close to $8 million dollars-because
CSX proved that i i cases were wrongfully filed and the plaintiffs' attorneys
knowingly used a bad doctor to find those 11 cases. These proposals are
meant, in part, to prevent such a result.
These legislative solutions could meet similar opposition at the policymaking level. There are staunch RICO advocates on both sides of the political
333.

18 U.S.C.

§ 1341

(2012).

Curtis & Assocs., P.C. v. Law Offices of David M. Bushman, Esq., 758 F. Supp. 2d 153,
334.
175 (E.D.N.Y. 201o), affdsubnom. Curtis v. Law Offices of David M. Bushman, Esq., 443 F. App'x
582 (2d Cir. 201 1); see alsoCHARLEs DOYLE, MAILAND WIRE FRAUD: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL
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aisle who might be resistant to changes that would narrow its use. However,
the fact that attorneys are now wielding RICO as a weapon against both the
defense and plaintiffs' bar might offer some hope for reform on this front.
Congress has shown itself willing to reform RICO to prevent its application in
areas perceived as sufficiently covered by other remedies. For example,
Congress amended RICO through the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Actass to prohibit the use of un-convicted securities fraud as a predicate act.
Congress's stated intent in doing so-to prevent the use of RICO to bypass
the development of private civil remedies under the securities laws3s 6-should
resonate in this context as well. Just as in the securities context, the RICO
reprisal "virtually eliminates decades of legislative and judicial development
of private civil remedies."37
VII.

CONCLUSION

These solutions would go a long way towards protecting pure litigation
activities from over-enforcement, but what is really at issue here is the defense
bar's use of RICO to undercut aggregate litigation. Even if frivolous litigation
is a genuine problem in aggregate litigation, this Article demonstrates why the
RICO reprisal must be rejected as a remedy.
Any solution to the problem of frivolous aggregate litigation must
balance conflicting issues of access to justice, efficiency, and reduction of
waste in the judicial system. Other remedies exist that are designed precisely
to do this, including common-law torts like malicious prosecution and abuse
of process, and procedural sanctions like those found in Rule ii. Although
there are legitimate complaints that these remedies do not adequately deter
frivolous litigation, their inadequacy alone cannot serve as a principled reason
for supporting civil RICO as a solution. Instead, efforts should be made to
reform devices like Rule i i and malicious prosecution. Such reform should
include consideration of the historical balance of competing interests
involved in prosecuting frivolous litigation-a balance that the RICO reprisal
fails to incorporate. It is also important that reformers revisit these devices not
in isolation, but in a holistic manner. No amount of reforming any one device
will suffice. Instead, tort theories, procedural-sanctions rules, and disciplinary
rules should be analyzed and refined in conjunction with each other to come
up with a coordinated frivolous-litigation scheme.3s 8

335.
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
336.
See Regan Gibson & Kevin Homiak, RacketeerInfluenced and CorruptOrganizations,50 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1423, 1429 n.50 (2013) (citing legislative history).
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 505 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting). For a
337.
thorough discussion of the amendment of RICO in securities fraud context, including the competing
perspectives on the necessity for such an amendment, see generally Justin D. Weitz, A Necessary
Supplement: ReinvigoratingCivil RICO's SecuritiesFraudPredicate, 21 WiDENER L. REV. 27 (2015).
See Wade, supra note 22, at 494 (stating that "[w]hat is needed is a conscious effort to
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The specific harms that need to be addressed before a precise remedy or
reform can be proposed must also be disaggregated. On the one hand, there
are harms caused by the "bad attorney" who makes choices in litigation that
are morally wrong, including to bring frivolous cases for an improper
purpose. For this type of wrong, remedies like Rule i i and malicious
prosecution have been developed, and if they are flawed, they should be
reformed. On the other hand, there are structural harms wrought through
the design of the aggregate-litigation devices themselves. These include the
specific harm at issue in CSX the fact that weak cases can be lumped in with
strong cases by using an aggregate-litigation device. But to the extent that this
happens, it is due at least in part to the economic incentives that private
plaintiffs' attorneys have to bring more cases in order to subsidize any losses.
To the extent that the flaw is structural, and not individual, the remedy is to
change those devices, not to penalize, disincentivize, and threaten private
attorneys general as a whole.
In this Article, I offer a proposal that is designed to bring the application
of civil RICO in line with legal doctrine, including RICO, the corresponding
state common-law torts and immunities, and the REA, and to address
normative concerns, like the proper balance of state interests and federal
docket regulation. At the same time, these proposals are meant to ensure
adequate protection for the public law aggregate-litigation attorney. Such a
person is in the unique position of acting in a quasi-governmental capacity,
doing a massive amount of work and filing a massive amount of documents
and, in the process, taking on a high cost and risk in pursuit of public interest.
Critics often overlook these facts in the ethical discussion. It is important to
situate the everyday reality of the aggregate-litigation attorney within the
existing tort and ethical standards.
As Coffee recognizes, the goal of reform should be to "redirect the
private attorney general to serve the public interest."ss9 The procedural and
structural reforms I propose for class actions and other aggregate devices are
aimed at doing precisely that. Individual wrongdoers can and should be
punished, but there are already tools to accomplish that, and regulators must
be careful not to adopt new tools like civil RICO that preclude the use of the
aggregate-litigation device itself.

coordinate the procedural and tort law, so that the trial can be handled as simply as possible
without the interference of frivolous litigation abuses and without inconsistent results in the
original and second trials").
COFFEE, supra note 2, at 229.
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